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ABSTRACT
MOBILIZATION AND THE POWER OF THE ENGLISH CROWN DURING THE WARS OF THE ROSES
By
Cory Szaro
University of New Hampshire, May, 2022

Historians of the period of the Wars of the Roses have long debated about the power of the
English Crown relative to that of the nobility in fifteenth-century England. These historians have often
based their arguments on outdated notions of “bastard feudalism” and supported them using biased
narrative sources. This study draws upon the patent rolls and close rolls produced by the royal
government to examine the different aspects of English military organization during the period from
1452 to 1477. The evidence contained within these sources demonstrates that military mobilization
relied on the enduring authority of the Crown and its central administration. Expeditionary forces relied
on the Crown’s ability to provide funding, transportation, victuals, ordnance, and specialists.
Mobilization for coastal defense and other domestic service was based on the Crown’s authority to raise
local forces via commissions of array. The maintenance and administration of garrisons required royal
officers and constant funding. Whenever possible, the Crown funded military forces by granting access
to local sources of revenue which it had the authority to manipulate. In short, the Crown commanded
the manpower and resources which made English military forces function.

1

I. INTRODUCTION
Historiography
The period of the Wars of the Roses provides a fascinating opportunity to observe the
operations of the English government in a period of dramatic change. The English suffered the dramatic
loss of most of their lands in France; the mental breakdown of King Henry VI; the rise of Richard Neville,
earl of Warwick; the series of betrayals and domestic conflicts between Yorkists and Lancastrians; and
the repeated depositions of Henry VI and Edward IV in the 1460s. It is no wonder that this period has
attracted the attention of political historians. One of the most prominent debates within the
historiography of the Wars of the Roses is that which concerns the relationship between kings and their
most powerful subjects. Recent scholarship on this matter is divided between those who see this
relationship as contentious and those who see it as cooperative. The former, influenced heavily by K. B.
McFarlane’s ideas about the nature of feudal government in fifteenth-century England, argue that the
practice of bastard feudalism allowed “overmighty subjects” to challenge the Crown’s power and
authority by raising their own private armies. The Wars of the Roses, therefore, were the ultimate
expression of this conflict between king and nobility.
Michael Hicks, who follows many of the insights first developed by McFarlane, is a proponent of
this view. He argues that overmighty subjects arose through “the weakness of contemporary kings” who
“lacked the spare resources to throw against external threats and to maintain the armies and fleets
necessary to deter, prevent, or defeat invasions.”1 Hicks describes the Wars of the Roses as a series of
conflicts “fought between kings and the heads of the greatest noble houses” who raised private armies
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via the mechanisms of bastard feudalism.2 Hicks states that the nobility and gentry, as a class,
“commanded far more manpower than the king.”3 To bring this manpower to bear against the king, who
individually possessed the largest household and greatest number of estates, the nobility formed
factions.4 In this version of English history, the king was simply the most powerful of the feudal landlords
who held a theoretical claim to everyone else’s allegiance. In Hicks’ words, “Bastard feudalism was
power.”5
Those who disagree with this portrayal of English society argue that the relationship between
king and nobility was not inherently antagonistic. A leading proponent of the “cooperative model,”
Christine Carpenter, argues that cooperation between the nobility and the Crown was a foundational
feature of English government during the fifteenth century. She describes the nobility as “the essential
linking point between command and enforcement” and nobles themselves as “the essential
intermediaries between king and lesser landowners.”6 Additionally, the nobles “represented the realm
to the king” and provided counsel.7 Carpenter writes:
[The nobles] willingly sustained the king’s power by placing their own at his disposal because
they needed him, his majesty and his authority. Any society whose basis is land is very
vulnerable to conflict and upheaval, which can destroy the land and its produce. It will need a
system for regulating disputes and dealing with disorder, and in medieval England the system
that evolved was the king’s. Equally only the king could guarantee the country’s safety against
its enemies and lead it into foreign war… All landowners had to be sure that no-one but the king
could use [the king’s authority], but the nobility needed this security most of all. Only the king
could stand above the nobles and prevent them attacking each other. Ineffective rule nearly
always resulted in disunity among the nobility.8
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In short, “There was in fact a large degree of consensus binding together monarch and ruling
aristocracy.”9 As Carpenter states, “To put it very crudely, kings and landowners were a ruling elite. They
had a common interest in taking much of the country’s surplus for themselves, in keeping hegemony,
and in maintaining a level of stability which would keep their lands safe… For all these reasons both
nobility and gentry were bound to stand up for the powers of the monarchy.”10 There was little sense in
rebellion when the stakes were so high.
A problematic feature of the historiographical debate regarding the political organization of
fifteenth-century England, however, is the lack of attention to institutional structures. In particular, the
military institutions of this period, who controlled them, and ultimately the basis of military power, have
received very little attention from both the “antagonistic” and “cooperative” schools. The result is that
many histories of this period discuss the relationship between the Crown and the nobility without
discussing the records which show how military power actually worked. The exercise of military power
is, after all, the core of the matter. The concept of bastard feudalism suggests that a powerful subject
could rival the Crown through his own resources and independent military authority. This is the essence
of both the “antagonistic” and “cooperative” models, which differ only in their arguments about
whether the nobility saw its interests aligned with or against those of the Crown. However, the model of
bastard feudalism is fundamentally flawed. Historians who explain the Wars of the Roses in terms of
bastard feudalism have not devoted enough attention to the ways in which English armies were
mobilized, transported, supplied, and fed. When due attention is given to these matters, it becomes
clear that it was the royal government that maintained control over the military institutions of the
kingdom, even under weak or incompetent kings such as Henry VI. Consequently, political authority,
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based on military power, could only be achieved through control over the institutions of the royal
government.
Sources
Traditional military histories of the Wars of the Roses focus on narrative sources to reconstruct
the timeline of events and provide some information about the major battles of the period. Narrative
sources are valuable for providing a chronology of events, but they suffer from a number of problems
which make them unsuitable for understanding warfare and the institutional structures which made
mobilization possible. First, the authors of narrative sources were driven by their own political agendas.
These were not impartial witnesses and their accounts are often biased. Some of these biases are made
obvious by the authors’ praise for the leaders of one side and denigration of those on the other side.
Other biases, including a lack of interest in the details of military organization, are present but less
obvious.
In contrast, the patent rolls and close rolls, produced by the royal chancery as part of the central
royal administration and largely ignored by historians of this period, contain a staggering amount of
information about how the Crown mobilized men, ships, ordnance, supplies, and provisions for military
service overseas and within the British Isles. The patent rolls are especially useful, as they offer a
running record of all of the letters patent issued by the Crown. The royal government used these letters
to appoint officials, issue commissions, grant money and land, and otherwise project the Crown’s will
throughout the kingdom. The close rolls for the latter half of the fifteenth century serve primarily as a
record of grants. They contain less information about military matters than the patent rolls, but in some
instances they offer information to support conclusions gleaned from the patent rolls.
This study draws upon these records to examine the different aspects of English military
organization during the period from 1452 to 1477. The decision to focus on this period is based on
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several considerations. First, there is the nature of the source material. The patent rolls are divided into
collections as follows: 1452-1461, 1461-1467, and 1467-1477. Second, there were multiple significant
events which took place during this period. Focusing on these sets of records allows one to examine two
major expeditionary campaigns undertaken by two different kings: Henry VI’s mobilization for the
Aquitaine campaign of 1452-53 and Edward IV’s mobilization for his invasion of France in 1475.
Additionally, the turbulence of the intervening years offers a means of examining military matters
related to coastal defense and domestic conflict. France raided Sandwich in 1457, domestic conflict
escalated sharply in 1459, Yorkist rebels captured Henry VI in 1460, and Edward IV ascended to the
throne in 1461.
An examination of the patent rolls for this period demonstrates that military operations
depended on cooperation between the king, his most powerful subjects, and local authorities. Most of
the retinues mobilized for foreign service were funded by the Crown, either directly or indirectly. There
were exceptions to this, such as when Anthony Woodville, earl of Rivers, volunteered to lead a retinue
to Brittany at his own expense in 1472. Even in this instance, however, Woodville received permission
from the Crown to raise and lead his own force. Mobilizing naval forces relied heavily on impressment
backed by royal authority, and most mariners served for royal wages. Again, exceptions prove the rule.
The men serving at sea with the earl of Warwick during his time as “keeper of the sea” under Henry VI
did so for “the earl’s wages,” but the earl received royal funding to raise and maintain his fleet. Once the
earl became a rebel, Henry VI moved to seize the ships, men, and materiel he had raised. Domestic
operations relied heavily on commissions of array to mobilize soldiers, which depended on cooperation
between the Crown and local authorities. Additionally, war called for an array of specialists, laborers,
and officers to produce, maintain, and transport ordnance and other materiel. Mobilization for war also
required the levying of large quantities of food, the supply and transportation of which required
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additional men and logistical planning. Again, mobilizing these men and resources depended on a
system in which the king, or those who controlled the king, commanded his subjects’ obedience.

7

II. EXPEDITIONARY ARMIES
Raising Soldiers for Foreign Service
There is substantial scholarship on the mobilization of English men for continental service during
the Hundred Years’ War. Historians generally agree that the Crown relied on the use of indentures to
recruit armies for foreign service. An indenture was essentially a service contract between the Crown
and an individual tasked with raising and leading a military force. Neil Jamieson observes that “there
was a voluntary element in such service which was necessary to sustain a long war abroad.”11 In fact,
this was “virtually the only way used in the time of Henry VI.”12 Anne Curry offers an overview of how
the indenture system worked in her article, “English Armies in the Fifteenth Century.” She explains that
“once captains had indented with the crown, the Exchequer was instructed to make payment, usually
giving the captain half the wages due for his intended company immediately with the remainder being
handed over at embarkation.”13 Royal officials took muster of the indentured companies before
embarkation to ensure that the captain provided the agreed-upon force.14 Curry writes that “by 1415
the indenture format was well established as were the conditions of service,” although variations
occurred to meet the circumstances of the present campaign.15 Such variations “also suggest that
captains were keen and able to negotiate advantageous arrangements” such as “favorable replies to
petitions” and payment of arrears for prior service.16
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Additionally, there was the matter of the background of the individuals with whom the Crown
decided to establish indenture relationships. “In some cases,” Curry writes, “the crown entered into only
one ‘great’ indenture, usually with a leading nobleman, for all of the troops intended to make up the
expeditionary army.”17 In other instances, “the crown indented with many individuals who promised to
bring companies of varying sizes which together made up the army.”18 How retinue leaders recruited
men is more of a mystery. Jamieson suggests the plausibility of retinue leaders focusing their
recruitment efforts on “family members and local men.”19 As soldiers “either died or left” in the course
of a campaign, they could be “replaced by soldiers recruited on the spot” in France.20 A large number of
these soldiers were archers. Regarding the predominance of archers in the armies of this period, Curry
argues that “archers were easier to recruit” in large numbers and cheaper to maintain than men-atarms.21
The patent rolls contain numerous entries related to the armies which Henry VI raised for
service in Aquitaine in 1452 and 1453. Considering that the Aquitaine campaign marks an important
moment at the tail end of the Hundred Years’ War, which has received considerable attention from
military historians, it serves as a good place to begin an examination of the military systems that were in
place during the Wars of the Roses. In his book The Fall of English France, David Nicolle writes that the
force which John Talbot, earl of Shrewsbury, took in September 1452 to retake Aquitaine consisted of
about 3,000 men.22 The evidence in the patent rolls provides information about how these forces were
raised and maintained. Gervase Clyfton, knight and treasurer of Calais, was originally retained to serve
with 1,000 men-at-arms and archers, the muster of which was commissioned in August 1452.23 In May
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1453, however, Clyfton submitted an account claiming that his service continued for two months longer
than the three months originally agreed upon, with the result that Clyfton paid 400£ out of his own
pocket to keep his men in service.24 Then, after using his retinue to retake Bordeaux “and other towns
and castles,” Clyfton hired 50 men-at-arms at a rate of 10 francs per month and 350 archers at a rate of
5 francs per month to serve as garrison soldiers to secure conquered territories for three months.25 The
cost of retaining these men amounted to 675£.26 Clyfton thus claimed that he spent 1075£ and five
months over what was agreed upon in the original indenture.27 To compensate him, the king granted
Clyfton 500£ from the monies granted to the king by Parliament.28
A similar account for Edward Hull, knight and constable of Bordeaux, also appears in the patent
rolls. Like Clyfton, Hull was retained to serve with 1,000 men for three months but ended up retaining
his men for an additional two months at the additional cost of 600£.29 Also like Clyfton, Hull hired men
to serve as garrison soldiers to secure the fortifications that the English retook from the French. He
retained 60 men-at-arms for 10 francs a month and 420 archers for 5 francs per month for three
months, costing him a total of 765£.30 The portion of arrears which Hull received from the king was
600£.31 It is not unreasonable to suppose that Talbot also brought at least 1,000 men on the expedition,
considering the leading role he played in the Aquitaine campaign. The earl of Shrewsbury was still owed
6797£ 18s 2 ¼d in arrears in April 1453, the outstanding portion of a grand total of 10,426l 4 ¼d spent in
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royal service on the continent over several years.32 The king allowed him to keep 800 marks a year from
the wool subsidy collected at Calais as a means of repaying him over time.33
These accounts, submitted after the fact, demonstrate several key points about the indenture
system as it operated in the mid-fifteenth century. First, the accounts support much of what Curry and
other historians have said about the matter. The initial indentures were between the king and the
individual retinue leaders, who were in turn responsible for raising and paying their own retinues with
the funds they received from the Crown. Clyfton and Hull asked only for payment of additional
expenses, suggesting that they had already been fully paid what had been granted in their original
indentures. However, the retinues continued service beyond the duration originally agreed upon
between the military commanders and the Crown. Evidently, retinue leaders could petition the king to
compensate them for serving longer than anticipated. In this case, the king was willing and able to grant
some recompense. Clyfton and Hull each received close to half of their reported arrears, pending further
certification.
The repayment of Talbot via the wool subsidy is demonstrative of another important aspect of
war finance in fifteenth-century England. The king often preferred to grant payments from customs
revenue and other local sources of income. Customs collectors and other port authorities were royal
agents who held office by the Crown’s authority. The king, therefore, could direct his officials to pay
certain individuals (or their agents) a portion of the monies they were supposed to collect on behalf of
the Crown. This allowed the king to pay his military leaders over time rather than distributing large lump
sums at a time when funds granted by Parliament were needed for other purposes.

32
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This system, in which a king could establish indenture relationships with multiple captains and
then pay them through various channels, including revenues granted by Parliament and fixed sources of
income such as customs, is indicative of a strong centralized administration. Additionally, these forms of
payment and repayment reveal some important elements of the nature of the relationship between the
Crown and its military leaders. The captains themselves were men of high status who held important
royal offices. These were loyal men performing military service as agents of the Crown, not mercenaries
working for the highest bidder. The fact that their services continued beyond the terms of their initial
contracts is demonstrative of their allegiance to the king. In these instances, the men had to pay their
soldiers out of their own resources and wait until a later date to receive any reimbursement from the
Crown.
The 1470s saw another flurry of military activity under Edward IV. There were, of course,
preparations for the king’s campaign against France. Forces were being raised for service as early as
1468, years before Edward IV launched a large-scale invasion in June 1475. There was also a force raised
to go to Ireland in 1474 and another in 1475 as part of a separate military campaign there. The records
in the patent rolls suggest that the way in which Edward IV raised forces for foreign service in this period
was not much different from the way in which Henry VI raised forces to go to Aquitaine twenty years
earlier. By contrast, the expedition to Brittany in 1472 stands as an exception to the rule, made possible
by the voluntary participation of the earl of Rivers. Even in this case, the primacy of the Crown is evident
from the earl’s need to obtain a royal license to raise his own troops at his own cost. The other
expeditions mentioned above all follow the familiar customs of indenture with the king, leaving the
Crown as the ultimate guarantor of the pay of the soldiers being mobilized.
The expedition to Brittany was the first step in the king’s planned invasion of France. In October
1468, Anthony Woodeville was appointed “governor and captain of the king’s armed power shortly
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proceeding to sea and elsewhere.”34 The king commissioned a nobleman and loyal Yorkist, William
Hastings, and others to take a muster of Woodeville “and the king’s soldiers in his company” at
Gravesend.35 John Fogge, a trusted knight with a history of loyal service to the Crown and the Yorkist
faction, was among the officials tasked to do the same at Sandwich.36 Patent roll entries from the
following year tell us more about these forces. An entry dated April 28, 1469 reads as follows:
Whereas by indentures dated 10 September last the king retained Walter, lord Mountjoy, to
serve him and his kinsman the duke of Brittany in their wars against their adversary Louis calling
himself the king of France for a period of six months, receiving certain wages for himself and his
retinue, and this voyage to the duchy of Brittany was restrained by the king and the indentures
were void and of no effect, and because the said lord Mountjoye received at the king’s
command from the treasurer and chamberlains of the Exchequer certain sums of money for the
wages of himself and his retinue he offered his service to go to other places at the king’s
command, and the king desired him to serve him at sea with 1,000 soldiers for a quarter of a
year and with 500 mariners in the company of Anthony, lord Scales, receiving certain wages, as
appears in a writ of privy seal, and he served accordingly until otherwise ordered; the king
hereby pardons to him all offences committed by him and all debts and accounts due from him
to the king in this matter, although he did not serve for the full quarter of a year.37
A separate entry from May 1469 notes that Woodeville was also retained on September 10 of the
previous year “to serve [the king] by sea and land for the defence of the realm with 3,000 men and
1,100 mariners for the space of a quarter of a year, receiving certain wages for himself and the men and
mariners, and with five lancers assigned to him beyond the said number.”38 As above, the king pardoned
“all debts and accounts due from him to the king in this matter” despite the service ending earlier than
originally agreed upon.39
Later, in June 1472, Edward IV again turned to Woodeville. The king granted him license to “take
1,000 men at arms and archers out of the realm to Brittany and other parts beyond the seas at his own
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expense with certain captains appointed by him to go where he pleases.”40 The king also granted that
“proclamation be made that anyone wishing to go to him has licence to do so.”41 This force was to aid
the Bretons in their defense against a French invasion. The wording of the records suggests that the
expedition was voluntary. Unlike the force raised in late 1468, this military effort does not appear to
have been financed by the Crown. Additionally, the king’s permission to recruit for the expedition is
explicit. All of this suggests that even a voluntary force, led and funded by a loyal earl, required the
king’s blessing before it was considered legitimate.
The following month, Edward IV commissioned William, earl of Arundel, and others to take the
muster of “the men at arms, armed men and archers in the retinue of Galliard de Dureford, whom the
king has ordered to go beyond the seas to resist his enemies.”42 The king had appointed Dureford, a
Gascon noble with a history of loyal service, “to the command of an armed power which the king is
sending beyond the seas to resist his enemies.”43 In December, the king also appointed Robert Green, a
knight, as “leader and governor of an armed force of men at arms and archers which the king has
ordered to be sent to foreign parts for the resistance of his enemies.”44 These last two retinues were
ordered by the king, suggesting that they were financed by the king according to the familiar indenture
system.
The records of the mobilization of these forces highlight the importance of the role of the royal
government in military preparations. The voluntary expedition by the earl of Rivers, despite being
funded by the earl himself, required a royal license to be considered legitimate. The forces led by
Dureford and Green were mobilized via royal indentures. When the time came for the main invasion of
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France in 1475, Edward IV continued to utilize royal indentures to raise troops. Fortunately, the planning
for this invasion was well-documented. First, preparations for the invasion were preceded by yet
another force raised by the king to assist continental allies against the French. In March 1474, the king
appointed John Parre and John Sturgeon, both knights, to “take muster at some place near Suthwark of
13 men at arms and 1,000 archers whom the king has ordered to be sent beyond the seas to his brother
Charles, duke of Burgundy.”45 This expedition to aid the Burgundians was soon followed by large-scale
preparations for a royal campaign against the French. This included the recruitment of a very large
invasion force, a major component of which consisted of archers. In November 1474, the king appointed
commissioners to collect the monies which Parliament had granted “for the defence of his realm and
subjects in part payment of the wages of 13,000 bowmen, each receiving 6d daily for one year.”46
Final preparations and musters for the invasion took place in May and June. In May, the king
commissioned the earl of Essex and others to “take muster of all soldiers and others belonging to the
king’s ordnance to be sent to France at a field called ‘Seynt Kateryns Mede’ and to certify thereon to the
king with all haste.”47 Retinue leaders for a campaign in Brittany were also established. In June 1475, the
king appointed “John, lord Audeley, and Galliard Dureford, lord Duras, to the rule and governance of an
armed force which the king has ordered to be sent to the parts of Brittany.”48 Another entry in the
patent rolls describes the same two men as “captains of the army of armed men and archers” going to
Brittany and grants them “power to treat in the king’s name with commanalties and persons willing to
come to the king’s obedience” to avoid “shedding of Christian blood.”49 On June 12, the king
commissioned the earl of Arundel and several others to take muster of this force near Falmouth, which
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was supposed to consist of “2,000 men at arms, armed men and archers.”50 A similar commission
addressed to a different group of men went out on June 23, ordering the muster to take place near
Weymouth.51 It is unclear from the patent rolls whether the original muster was rescheduled or if this
was a second muster. That same month, the king commissioned a knight named John Scott and others
to “take muster of 104 archers of the retinue of William Hastynges of Hastynges, knight, in any
convenient place near Calais.”52
In addition to this campaign in France, Edward IV organized a separate military campaign in
Ireland. The records related to mobilization for the Irish campaign provide more evidence of royal
control over military matters. In August 1474, the king commissioned a number of men including the
loyal knight William Stanley to “take muster of the king’s knight Gilbert Debenham and 400 archers in
his company whom the king has ordered to be sent to Ireland in any place near the city of Chester on 9
September next or within three days following.”53 Another force was arranged to cross to Ireland the
following year. In April 1475, the king commissioned Stanley and others to “take muster of Thomas
Danyell and 100 archers at the king’s wages and 120 archers at the wages of the inhabitants of Ireland,
going to Ireland in the company of the said Thomas for the resistance of the king’s enemies, at any
suitable place near the city of Chester on 11 May next.”54 Evidently, some were reluctant to serve in
Ireland. There were a number of deserters from Debenham’s retinue who subsequently were to be
pressed into service in Danyell’s. While Danyell’s force was being raised, the king ordered the arrest of
John Rutter, John Obryth, and “others who have received the king’s wages from Gilbert Debenham to
serve the king in Ireland in his company but have not yet come to the king’s service.”55 The men were to
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be imprisoned “until they shall restore the said wages or find security that they will serve the king in the
company of the said Thomas Danyell.”56
The way the king divided the funding of Thomas Danyell’s retinue between royal wages and the
wages “of the inhabitants of Ireland” demonstrates a degree of flexibility in the system. The matters
related to the non-appearance of several of Debenham’s men is also fascinating. It is unclear whether
the men innocently missed their muster or if they took their wages and deserted. The fact that they
presumably received their wages in late 1474 and were subsequently targeted for arrest and
imprisonment in April 1475 suggests that they had deserted. In any case, the delinquents had taken
royal wages and were therefore the king’s soldiers, even if they were supposed to be part of
Debenham’s retinue. Furthermore, they were offered a chance to serve in a different retinue to keep
those wages. The Crown was more concerned with getting its money’s worth than it was with
punishment.
An examination of the details regarding these expeditionary forces mobilized by Edward IV for
campaigns in both France and Ireland demonstrates that the central authority of the Crown remained
strong in the 1470s. Like Henry VI, Edward IV raised armies by contracting with loyal men of high status.
Wages were established by indentures and paid by royal agents from a variety of royal revenue streams.
Musters were confirmed by knights and local authorities who received their commissions from the king.
Desertion attracted royal attention. Such a system was only possible with a centralized administration
capable of projecting its authority and commanding the loyalty of those involved.
Mobilizing Ships
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As was true of mobilizing military contingents for service on land, the mobilization of ships for
foreign service also depended on the authority of the Crown. In order to raise and coordinate large
numbers of ships capable of carrying soldiers and ordnance overseas, the Crown relied on the royal right
of impressment. This right was not available to anyone who did not act in the king’s name or hold
delegated authority from the Crown. The patent rolls from the period of Henry VI’s Aquitaine campaign
of 1453 provide a detailed example of how the impressment system worked. In May 1453, a ship owner
named Thomas Martyn petitioned the king regarding his ship le Marie Bukyngham, which was forced to
abandon a voyage to Spain in order to carry Sir John Talbot’s retinue to Aquitaine.57 A patent roll entry
states, “Thomas caused the ship to return at his own costs of 7£ for the crossing of the said earl and his
retinue to Aquitaine and to delay thirteen weeks, and spent 109s each week in victualling the ship and
lost the freightage of his cargo, to wit, 28s for each tun, animating the possessors, masters and mariners
of other ships ordained for such crossing to serve the king better.”58 Apparently, it was understood that
ships pressed into service as transports would be free to load up with merchandise at Aquitaine before
returning to England. The entry states, “the earl would not allow the ship to be laden with merchandise
and brought back to England, as were other ships, but commanded it to be kept there because it was
strengthened with 41 complete cuirasses, 73 bows, 129 sheaves of arrows, 9 cannons and 4 barrels full
of ’gunpowdir,’ to Thomas’ loss of 486£.”59 As recompense for his losses, the king granted Martyn
customs-free shipping of wool from London and Southampton ports “whereof the customs paid by alien
merchants amount to 200 marks.”60
This account reveals specific details which are otherwise invisible in the more numerous
commissions to arrest ships. The entry shows that a merchant ship already underway and loaded with
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merchandise could be pressed into service at the king’s command. The ability of ship owners to have
their ships “laden with merchandise and brought back to England” at the end of their service, which
Martyn was denied, reveals another phenomenon. This was probably an incentive offered by the Crown
which allowed pressed shipmasters to compensate themselves for lost time and cargo, freeing up more
royal revenue which otherwise would have to be spent compensating petitioners like Martyn. The fact
that Martyn’s ship was instead kept in service and “strengthened” with arms demonstrates that ships
pressed for transport could be converted into military vessels through the addition of soldiers and
armament. It is also worth noting that, again, the king granted customs privileges as payment of arrears.
Given the inconveniences laid out in Thomas Martyn’s petition, it is no wonder that shipmasters
were not always enthusiastic about being pressed for military service. An entry in the close rolls
demonstrates that sometimes the king needed to place a shipmaster under a recognizance to secure his
service. In July 1452, “John Sharpp of Bristol the younger ‘marchaunt’” was placed under a recognizance
of 1000 marks.61 The condition was as follows:
Condition, that with a ship called the ‘Marie’ of Bristol of 300 tuns burden or less, or with two
ships each of 160 tuns or less and the men for them, he shall associate himself or his deputies
with John earl of Shrewsbury and others in his company retained with the king to serve at sea
for safe guard thereof and to resist the malice of his enemies, serving with them in that
company all the time of their retainer, and not departing without licence of the king or earl,
unless some lawful and reasonable impediment shall supervene.62
In short, if John Sharpp failed to meet the terms of the condition, he would be forced to pay 1000 marks.
A recognizance was one way to ensure cooperation, but more direct threats were also used. In
January 1453, the king commissioned Peter Boweman and John Breley, one of the king’s sergeants-atarms, “to arrest all ships and other vessels of the portage of 50 tuns and under necessary to serve the
king for the transport of an army appointed to go to Aquitaine, and masters and mariners for the
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governance thereof, in the port of London and thence to Fowy and there, and to have the same brought
to Plymmouth by 19 February next.”63 These ships were to be part of a fleet which was to carry an
expeditionary force led by John Talbot’s son, Viscount Lisle.64 Apparently, London shipmasters dragged
their feet and missed the February deadline. In March, a commission to Gilbert Parre and Thomas Gille
appointed them “to enjoin upon all masters and mariners of any ships and vessels in the port of London,
who have received any prests to take an army to Bordeaux, that they sail without delay to Plymmouth
where they will take aboard the said army; on pain of forfeiture of the said ships and vessels and of
answering to the king touching all damage arising on account of such delay; and to arrest all rebellious
herein and take them to one of the Counters of London to stay there in prison, until the king order their
delivery.”65
As these instances demonstrate, the centralized authority of the Crown was essential for raising
ships to carry Henry VI’s forces to France. Impressment was, at the very least, an inconvenience for
those being impressed. Without an administration capable of enforcing compliance, raising a large fleet
would have been impossible. The Crown was able to project its authority and command obedience,
resorting to recognizances and threats of forfeiture when necessary. And, of course, a centralized
administration allowed the royal government to coordinate the ships it impressed by instructing them to
rendezvous at specific ports.
The impressment system had not changed much by the time Edward IV was preparing forces for
his campaign in Brittany in 1468. In fact, there was even continuity in personnel. In August 1468, Adam
Godale and Peter Boweman were commissioned to “take ships and other vessels for the conduct of
Walter Blount of Mountjoye, knight, and certain soldiers going in his company to foreign parts, and
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masters and mariners for them, to be in the port of Portesmouth or any other port assigned by 28
September next.”66 These same two men were also ordered to secure ships for Anthony Woodeville,
which were to be gathered at Gravesend.67 As noted above, Peter Boweman had been actively engaged
in the impressment system in 1453 when Henry VI needed ships to carry a force led by Viscount Lisle.
This continuity is further evidence of the fact that the bureaucracy of the Crown remained strong
throughout this period. As the remainder of this study will demonstrate, Peter Boweman was just one of
many men who repeatedly acted as royal officials throughout this period.
Sometimes, however, the Crown decided to send commissions directly to the owners of ships. In
June 1472, around the time Woodeville’s voluntary expedition to Brittany, discussed above, received
royal approval, the king commissioned numerous shipmasters to “take” mariners for their ships.68
Interestingly, the commissions were sent to the shipmasters by name, with the names of their ships also
specified. The intended role of these ships is not clear in the patent rolls. The only reason given in the
entries is “for the resistance of the king’s enemies.”69 Because the expedition led by the earl of Rivers
was to be funded by the earl rather than the Crown, it is likely that the earl was responsible for securing
transportation for his troops. In the same month, however, the king appointed John Kyryell, John Cole,
and William Fetherstone “to the command of an armed power which the king is sending to sea to resist
his enemies and rebels.”70 John Fogge and others were appointed to take muster of the “men at arms,
archers and mariners” of the said men near Sandwich.71 This appears to be part of a defensive naval
force. The commissions to shipmasters were probably intended to provide ships for this purpose rather
than for Woodville. It is likely, however, that once he had retained Galliard de Dureford and Robert
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Green, the king was able to divert some of those ships to carry their retinues across the channel. In any
case, sending commissions directly to shipmasters was a clear projection of the Crown’s authority to
impress any ship of the realm as deemed necessary by the royal government.
Preparations for the 1475 invasion of France involved the familiar use of widespread
impressment. In December 1474, the king commissioned Thomas Markham “to examine all ships and
vessels of the partage of 16 tons and over in any ports, places and creeks in the ports of London and
Sandwich and from thence by the sea coast to the port of Bristol and to certify thereon to the king and
council with all speed and to take and impress them at his discretion for the conduct of the king’s army
and ordnance to France.”72 A similar commission was sent to Richard Exton regarding ships “in the water
of Lye to Orwell and from thence by the sea coast to the port of Newcastle on Tyne.”73 Commissions to
procure ships continued throughout the months leading up to June 1475. In January, the king sent
commissions to the masters and pursers of specific ships which instructed each recipient to “take
mariners for the conduct of the said ship and workmen for its repair, as the king is going with an armed
force to France for the recovery of his right there.”74 In February, the king issued similar commissions to
the master and purser of “a ship of the king called Grace Dieu” as well as the master of “a ship called
Marye Asshe.”75 An undated entry, but one which was almost certainly issued in the same timeframe,
shows that Alvred Cornburgh was commissioned to “seize all ships of the portage of 16 tuns and over in
any ports, creeks and places of the counties of Devon and Cornwall and the town of Bristol and take
them to the Thames and elsewhere at the king’s command for the conduct of the king’s army to France,
and to take masters and mariners for their governance and to arrest and imprison the disobedient.”76
This entry is followed by commissions to Thomas Markham and Richard Exton which appear to be
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renewals of their previous commissions to impress ships.77 In April, the king sent a commission to John
Shout, Richard Exton, and Richard Till “to take any ships along the sea coast from Lyght and Wakeryng in
the hundred of Rocheford by the whole county of Essex and the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk and Lincoln
to the town of Kyngeston on Hull and masters and mariners for their governance and sufficient gear and
to bring the ships to the port of Suthampton with all haste.”78 Similar commissions went out regarding
ships “along the sea coast by the counties of Devon and Cornwall” and “in the river Thames from the
city of London to Gravesende and thence to Sandewich and thence by the sea coast to Mynehede.”79 In
May, William Brambyll and John Kyryell were appointed to “take mariners for a ship called la
Fawekon.”80 Other commissions to shipmasters and pursers of specific ships went out the same
month.81 In late August 1475, the king commissioned Thomas Usher and Geoffrey Kent to “take certain
ships in certain ports and creeks of the counties of Essex and Suffolk and masters and mariners and gear
for them and to take them to the port of Calais with all haste.”82 Presumably, this unspecified number of
ships was meant to support William Hastings’ retinue, the muster of which was ordered to take place at
Calais the month prior.
In addition to all of these ships, which were mobilized to support the king’s invasion of France,
numerous additional ships were raised for service between February and July 1475 for other purposes.
Whereas the abovementioned ships were raised “for the conduct of the king’s army to France,” there
were commissions sent to shipmasters, pursers, and captains on February 27, February 22, and March 3
which vaguely state that their ships were to serve “for the conduct of an armed force which the king has
ordered to go to sea.”83 In April, John Dynham was appointed ”to the command of an armed force which
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the king has ordered to go to sea to resist his enemies.”84 A patent roll entry shows that in July the king
was indebted to John Wethepoll and John Jaye, “who at the king‘s command prepared five ships of their
with mariners to resist the king‘s enemies of France at sea and continued in the king‘s service at sea
from 3 February to 10 July at their own expense.“85 The king owed the two men 190l 15s, which he
repaid by granting them shipping in the ports of Bristol and Hampton “quit of customs and subsidies to
the said sum.”86 The king was also indebted to Thomas Gale, who served with two ships “from 10
February last until 10 July.”87 In this instance, the total of 35£ 11s 2d was repaid with customs-free
shipping in the ports of Exeter and Dartmouth.88 Given the vague wording of the records regarding the
ships’ purpose, it is likely that they served as a defensive fleet.
The mobilization of ships for the Ireland campaign followed the same pattern. Ships were
impressed for the retinues of Gilbert Debenham and Thomas Danyell in 1474 and 1475. In August 1474,
Edward IV commissioned Robert Boolde and others to “take ships and vessels for the conduct of certain
men at arms and archers whom the king has ordered to be sent to Ireland in the company of Gilbert
Debeham, king’s knight, to resist the king’s enemies and rebels there, and masters and mariners for the
same.”89 For Danyell, the mayor of Chester and others were to “take ships and other vessels... and
masters and mariners for the same in the ports of Chester, Conway and Beawmarres and ’bowyers’ and
’flecchers’ and other workmen for the artillery.”90
As mentioned above, it appears that there were two methods of impressment available in this
period. First, the king could send commissions directly to individual shipmasters instructing them to
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provide specific ships with full crews. This allowed the king to specify the ships to be impressed and
delegate the task of procuring mariners to the shipmasters. Of course, this system required that the
king’s officials had a clear record of the ships, their tonnage, and their owners in the individual ports
where the crews and vessels were to be mobilized. Additionally, a direct commission to a named
individual may have ensured cooperation in a way reminiscent of how Henry VI placed a recognizance
on John Sharp. A shipmaster receiving a royal commission addressing him by name was unlikely to drag
his feet or feign ignorance. The other method available to the king was the familiar use of royal
commissioners appointed to impress ships within the realm at their own discretion. For this, the Crown
could draw from a host of men with a history of service. The fact that the same men served from reign
to reign, even during the transition from Lancastrian to Yorkist rule, indicates the institutionalization of
the process. Both methods of impressment were made possible by the authority of the Crown as a
centralized administrative force capable of projecting its will and commanding obedience.
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III. DEFENSIVE ARMIES
Raising Forces for Coastal Defense
Domestic military matters also received considerable attention from the Crown. The defensive
military organization of England during the fifteenth century was based on the need to defend the
coasts against foreign invasion.91 The burden of coastal defense was, unsurprisingly, born primarily by
the southern localities. Anne Curry notes that throughout the Hundred Years’ War, “the south coast
formed the first line of defence, bearing the brunt of enemy attack and the burden of maintenance of
fortifications as well as the ad hoc provision of soldiers through the commissions of array.”92 Because of
their strategic location, southern coastal towns and cities needed to consider military preparedness.
Curry notes that the local authorities in places like Dover, Canterbury, Southampton, and Sandwich
invested in military infrastructure with a focus on improving fortifications, acquiring guns, and
maintaining “urban defence forces” with regular musters.93 Randall Moffett’s article on Southampton
utilizes the administrative records from that town to examine defensive preparations on a local level,
demonstrating that “ever improving and acquiring more and more equipment was one way in which the
town of Southampton was able to fulfil its military obligation by strengthening all military aspects of the
town.”94
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Having towns like Southampton, fully invested in military preparedness, was undoubtedly
beneficial to the Crown in providing for the defense of the realm. The localities had an interest in their
own defense against foreigners. This meant that local authorities were more than willing to cooperate
with the Crown when the threat of foreign invasion loomed. The events of 1457, as recorded in the
patent rolls, demonstrate how the Crown mobilized ships and local levies to organize coastal defense.
In April of that year, several royal sergeants-at-arms, along with the customs officers and waterbailiffs in the ports of Sandwich, Dover, Winchelsea, and London, were commissioned to “arrest all ships
and other vessels of the portage of 30 tuns and over in the said ports to resist the king’s enemies who
daily presume to attack divers parts of the realm and other places subject to the king.”95 In February,
Henry VI commissioned John Lisle and others to “array all men of the Isle of Wight and to cause wards
and watches to be kept in the usual places to resist invasion of the king’s enemies, and to commit to
prison all who refuse to keep such wards and watches.”96 A similar commission went out to Thomas
Kyryell and others in May, instructing them to “cause watches to be kept on the seacoast of Kent and
especially between the towns of Dover and Rumney by all who are held to keep such watches, the king’s
enemies having attacked the said parts.”97
The situation escalated at the end of August, when a French force attacked Sandwich in Kent.98
The Crown responded by sending commissions to the mayors and bailiffs of Great Yarmouth, Pole,
Portsmouth, Southampton, and Winchelsea instructing them to “cause watches and scouts to be
stationed day and night in the more convenient places” for the “safe-keeping and defense of the said
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towns against invasion of the king’s enemies.”99 Similar commissions were sent to the captains of the
garrison at Guernsey and Jersey.100 At the same time, John Fastolf was commissioned to “attend to the
defence of Great Yarmouth and the adjacent parts.”101 Henry Bourghchier, the Archbishop of
Canterbury, and several prominent knights were appointed to “gather all lieges of the king in Kent to
resist the king’s enemies who have attacked that county with a great army.”102 The king also
commissioned the earl of Arundel and others in Sussex to “array and try all men at arms and other
fencible men, both hobelers and archers, within the county, and to lead them to the sea coast and
elsewhere in the county to resist the king’s enemies, and to take muster of the same from time to time,
and to cause ‘bekyns’ to be set up in the usual places.”103
Throughout the following months, the royal government endeavored to make sure that forces
were ready to defend the coasts. At the beginning of September, commissions of array went out to the
hundreds within the county of Southampton, instructing the recipients to “array and try all men at arms
and other fencible men, as well hobelers as archers... and lead them to the seacoast and other places in
the county to resist the king’s enemies.”104 Watches were to be kept and beacons set up “in the usual
places.”105 John Lisle and Henry Bruyn received a commission of array for the defense of the Isle of
Wight and Porchestre castle.106 Others were sent for the defense of Wilts, Somerset, and Dorset.107 Later
in the month, a similar commission went to Humphrey, “constable of Dover castle and warden of the
Cinque Ports“ and others in Kent.108 Similar commissions of array were sent to counties all over
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England.109 Edward Neville was appointed to ”the keeping and defence of Wynchelse, with power to
array and try the king’s lieges of that town and of Sussex.”110 The next day, the king sent a commission
to John Roger, Thomas Hexstall, and William Armurer ”appointing them to purvey bows, arrows,
arrowheads, cords, guns, ‘gonpowder, crosbowes,’ and ‘sulphur, saltpetyr and camfer’ for making
‘gonpowder’ and workmen, artificers and labourers for the working of ‘gonpowder’ and other things and
stuffs for the munition and defence of Dover castle and the adjacent ports.”111
Maintenance and preparations continued well into the following year. In February 1458, the earl
of Arundel and others were commissioned to “assign watches by the sea coast in Sussex and to cause
the ‘bekyns’ in the county to be repaired and if necessary others to be made and put in the usual
places.”112 In July, the king sent a commission to the mayor of Norwich and others “reciting that the
walls and turrets of the city are broken and the ditches under the walls and river of the city are
obstructed by weeds and rubbish thrown therein.”113 The royal writ instructed them to “survey the walls
and turrets and clear the ditches and river and repair the former for the defence of the city and adjacent
parts and to compel all residents to contribute thereto and to arrest labourers and carts, committing to
prison all contrary herein.”114
This ability to mobilize and coordinate local populations for coastal defense further
demonstrates the authority of the Crown regarding military matters. Throughout these months of
defensive action against a foreign threat, the Crown directed military matters from the center by issuing
commissions of array to earls, knights, local authorities, and other men of status. These men projected
the Crown’s authority into the localities in order to raise and coordinate defensive militias. The Crown

109

Ibid., 401-403.
Ibid., 401.
111
Ibid.
112
Ibid., 436.
113
Ibid., 441.
114
Ibid., 441.
110

29
also directed men to purvey armaments, mobilize ships, and organize work parties to repair and
maintain fortifications. Without a centralized administration to coordinate a larger defense, each locality
would have been left to defend itself. This was not the case in 1457.
Meanwhile, Henry VI’s government endeavored to bolster England’s naval defenses. On
September 5, the crown commissioned the “mayor, aldermen, sheriffs, and commonalty of London” to
“gather the men they propose to raise against the king’s enemies at their own costs, and to arrest any
vessels and ships and masters and mariners necessary for them, and to array and try the men at a
certain place and take the muster of the same, and to lead them against the said enemies.”115 On
October 3, the Crown commissioned the earl of Warwick “to go on the sea with an armed force and to
govern the same and war against the king’s enemies.”116 Over the following weeks, the government
began impressing ships. The Crown commissioned men to ”arrest the ships and other vessels and
masters and mariners necessary for an armed force ordered to go on the sea against the king’s enemies,
the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of London having prepared certain men to go with the said
army.”117 Others were appointed to “arrest and set mariners aboard certain ships in the port of Hull.”118
Individual shipmasters were commissioned by name to “arrest mariners... to serve against the king’s
enemies.”119 Thomas Everyngham and James Knyghley were appointed to “arrest all ships and vessels in
the port of Kyngeston upon Hull to serve against the king’s enemies.”120 The mayor and sheriff of Bristol
received a commission to “arrest all ships and vessels” in the port there, as well as “carpenters with
their instruments to serve for the repairs thereof, and 300 shovels and tribulas tipped with iron and 100
‘pykeys.’”121 A commission to Richard Grayell and Robert Chattok instructed them to not only take ships
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and mariners, but also to “purvey wheat, beer, ale, flesh, fish and other wholesome victuals for the
victualling of such ships and vessels.”122 Evidently, Gervase Clyfton once again provided men for service.
A commission to Henry Auger and others instructed them to take ships “necessary for the conduct of
Gervase Clyfton, knight, and certain men in his company, appointed to go on the sea to resist the king’s
enemies.”123
In December 1457, the Crown delegated the task of keeping the sea to the earl of Warwick. The
king commissioned Richard as follows:
Commission to the same earl, by advice and assent of the council, appointing him to go on the
sea according to the tenour of indentures made between the king and him, to war against the
king’s enemies and to govern all of his retinue and others flocking to him and to punish
delinquents and to arrest pirates and spoilers of merchants and fishermen both English and
foreign with their ships and vessels, and to punish the same, and to arrest sufficient vessels and
ships to serve at the usual wages and masters and mariners for the governance thereof and the
victuals necessary in this behalf during a term of three years according to his appointment on 26
November last.124
This commission included “power... to come to terms with any places and districts of the king’s enemies,
provided it be not prejudicial to the captain of Calais or his lieutenant there.” The commission also
guaranteed that “if he or any of his retinue acquire any place or fortalice of the king’s enemies and the
same be afterwards recovered, he or any of his retinue shall not be impeached for treason.”125
Colin Richmond argues that Richard was “entirely independent” from the Crown, receiving
negligible financial support and single-handedly raising and maintaining his own fleet.126 However, this
interpretation is not consistent with the information provided in the patent rolls and close rolls.
Although the earl of Warwick was granted a great deal of power, he did not operate entirely without
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royal supervision and support. To help fund this endeavor, the king granted Richard “all subsidies of
‘tonnage’ and ‘poundage’ in any ports of the realm except the ports of Suthampton and Sandwich.”127
Additionally, the Crown did send out orders to help provide for the earl’s fleet. In April 1458, the king
commissioned John Nanfan and others to “arrest the carpenters, smiths, ‘gunners’ and other workmen
necessary for the repair and munition of a ship called la Grace Dieu, which will sail with a fleet ordained
to resist the king’s enemies, and mariners for the governance thereof from the port of Bristol to the sea,
to serve for the money of Richard, earl of Warwick.”128 The commissioners were also to “purvey victuals,
timber, iron, nails, ‘gunnes’ and powder for the same.”129 In March 1459, Henry Auger and others were
commissioned to “arrest masters and mariners for the governance and conduct of certain ships and
vessels going on the safe-keeping of the sea in the company of Richard, earl of Warwick, or his
lieutenant, to serve at the earl’s wages.”130 They were also instructed to “purvey wheat, meal, ale, beer,
salt, flesh and fish and other victuals necessary for the victualling of the said ships and vessels, and
cannons, powder for cannons, ‘saltpetre,’ sulphur, coals, fuel, timber, arms for attack and defence, and
carriage.”131 In the same month, the king sent out two similar commissions to “arrest masters and
mariners” and “purvey victuals” for Richard’s fleet.132 Notably, these commissions were dispatched by
the royal government and not by the earl of Warwick. Without the mobilization of a vast array of
manpower and supplies provided through the administration of the royal government, it is not clear that
the earl would have been able to carry out the military duties that had been assigned to him by the
Crown.
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After Richard openly sided with the Yorkists, the Crown moved to recover as much of the
materiel collected by the earl as possible. In December 1459, the Crown sent a commission to John
Judde instructing him to “seize all ordnance and habiliments of war late of Richard, late duke of York,
Richard, late earl of Warwick, and Richard, late earl of Shrewsbury” and to “visit all castles, fortified
towns and fortalices in the realm and survey the ordnance and habiliments of war therein and repair
those that are insufficient by indentures to be made between him and the constables or keepers
thereof.”133 The king also commissioned the duke of Buckingham and several trustworthy knights to
“cause all ships and vessels in the port of Sandwich late of Richard, earl of Warwick, to be safely kept by
a fit number of gentlemen and others of Kent, so that they be not taken thence, and specially in ‘le
Sprynge’ tides.”134 Richard Grayell, one of the commissioners, was instructed to “take masters, mariners,
carpenters and smiths and other necessary for the keeping of the said ships and to arrest all wheat,
flour, ale, beer, oxen, sheep and other flesh, fish and victuals bought by the earl for the victualling of the
ships.”135 In March 1460, John Hadilsey was commissioned to “arrest divers harnesses and habiliments
of war, to wit, bows, arrows, crossbows, ‘jakes,’ pikes, cuirasses, ‘brygandynes,’ darts, lances, ‘glayves,’
‘lancegayes,’ cannons and powder therefor and other things purveyed for the defence of a ship called la
Grace Dieu, and certain tackling of the ship and meal of no small quantity for victualling the ship; certain
evildoers having taken the same.”136
From these records related to the earl of Warwick’s service as keeper of the sea, it is clear that
the Crown never relinquished its power over matters of naval defense. The earl was granted license to
act in the Crown’s best interest, receiving royal support as needed. When he rebelled, the Crown quickly
moved to assert its authority over the fleet which the earl had raised. Warwick’s fleet was a projection
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of the Crown’s authority, not evidence of its weakness. Furthermore, the Crown still had a pool of loyal
men and ships to draw from even after losing the loyalty of Warwick.
After Warwick turned rebel, Henry VI raised additional forces to keep the sea against him. In
December 1459, the Crown sent a commission to Richard Woodville, Thomas Broun, and the mayor of
Sandwich instructing them to “take near Sandwich the muster of the men at arms and archers ordered
to go on the safe-keeping of the sea in the company of Gervase Clyfton.”137 A similar commission to
Thomas Broun, Thomas Kyryell, and others called for the muster of men “ordered to go on the safekeeping of the sea in the company of Richard Wydevyle of Ryvers, knight, as above.”138 The next day,
William Scot was commissioned “for one year... to arrest ships and other vessels necessary for the
conduct of two hundred men at arms to go with him on the sea to resist the king’s enemies who do hurt
to the king’s subjects and specially to fishermen and other seagoers and dwellers by the coast, and for
the safe-keeping of Wynchelsee.”139 The commission included instructions to “arrest masters and
mariners... provided that no victuals, men, arms, horses, fuel or any other thing be taken in such ships
for the maintenance, victualling, fortification or relief of Calais.”140
The events of this period provide a means of outlining the organization of the English coastal
defense system. The seaborne portion of this system was, of course, the naval force raised by the Crown
for the “safe-keeping of the sea.” Ships, mariners, and specialists were raised via impressment, just as
they were for expeditionary campaigns. Because the earl of Warwick’s fleet was supposed to be funded
by tonnage and poundage, men impressed for service on his ships are described as serving at “the earl’s
wages.” The wages, however, were still “the usual wages” and the money still came from royal revenue
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streams which the king had diverted to this purpose. The retained soldiers who served on these ships
were raised via indentures with retinue leaders like the earl of Warwick and Gervase Clyfton. Details
about the numbers of men in these retinues generally were not included by royal clerks in the patent
roll entries. The one exception is the commission to William Scot, which mentions that he was to serve
with a force of 200 men-at-arms. Ordnance and victuals were raised by royal commissions instructing
men to purvey, or take, what was needed. All of this relied on the Crown’s power to grant funding and
command the obedience of its agents as well as that of local authorities.
The land-based portion of the coastal defense system was also centrally administered by the
Crown. It relied on local forces raised via commissions of array in times of heightened danger. Upon
intelligence (or fears) regarding a potential or ongoing invasion, the king could issue commissions of
array to trusted men and local authorities in the relevant counties. The recipients of the commissions
were charged with gathering their forces and leading them to designated coastal areas to keep watch
and stand ready to light beacons upon sight of an enemy force. If an enemy was already present, the
king could order the recipient of one of his commissions to lead his force against the threat. Again, the
Crown coordinated this system from the center rather than leaving each locality to fend for itself.
Mobilizing Forces for Domestic Conflict
The defensive aspects of English military organization could also be mobilized to resist rebels
during periods of domestic conflict. Michael Hicks argues that this is the kind of warfare which revealed
the importance of bastard feudalism. “No civil war,” he writes, “could have occurred without the
manpower [the aristocracy] deployed through the system that modern historians have called bastard
feudalism.”141 Such a system allowed a lord to mobilize his loyal household retainers as well as his
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tenants, “who had unwritten obligations also to turn out for their lord.”142 Nevertheless, Hicks
acknowledges that all of these men “owed fidelity to their lord against all men, except—as their
contracts made clear—the king, to whom an overriding allegiance was due.”143 Those raised via
commissions of array “were really the king’s men,” although Hicks emphasizes the fact that the king
“needed aristocrats to raise and command them.”144 The evidence demonstrates that Hicks is correct in
stating that the king relied on others to raise and command his forces. However, the crucial point is that
it was the Crown’s centralized administration that provided those aristocrats with the authority they
needed in order to mobilize men and resources.
The period of 1459 through 1461 was especially tumultuous, and permits an examination of the
mechanisms through which the crown raised men and ships to fight against rebels during two separate
reigns. Beginning in late 1459 and throughout most of 1460, Henry VI presided over a war against
Yorkist rebels. By 1461, Edward IV was a new king fighting to secure his rule from those who maintained
their loyalty to the Lancastrians. The evidence in the patent rolls suggests that both Henry VI and
Edward IV relied almost exclusively on commissions of array to raise field armies for domestic conflict.
Such a method of mobilization required loyal commissioners capable of compelling the obedience of
local authorities.
In October 1459, Henry VI issued a commission of array to Richard Woodville and the sheriff of
Kent to resist those “leagued in rebellion against the king and crown and allowed by certain persons
having the keeping of the town and castle of Calais to enter the same contrary to the king’s mandates,
and now preparing to arouse congregations and insurrections in the said county.”145 The commission
also appointed the recipients to “arrest all ships and other vessels late of the said earl of Warwick and all
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the tackling thereof and to keep the same for the king’s use.”146 In December, commissions of array
went out to various counties and cities to resist the Yorkists.147
Military preparations continued in earnest in 1460. In January, commissions of array went out to
Canterbury, Kent, and Sussex “to resist the rebels, adherents of Richard, earl of Warwick, who of late
entered the port of Sandwich and would have committed worse evils than they did there in divers parts
of Kent, if they could have entered the same.”148 The commission to Canterbury included instructions to
“keep watches and guard the gates of the city day and night.”149 In February, commissions went out to
“call together all lieges” in Suffolk, Norfolk, Kyngston upon Hull for the same purpose.150 At the end of
the month, the king commissioned the earl of Devon and another knight to “call together all lieges of
Somerset, Devon and Cornwall” to resist Yorkist rebels “if they should presume to enter the said
counties.”151 The commission included instructions to “take the muster of the men at arms and archers
of those counties, and to cause wards and watches and ‘bekyns’ to be appointed and set in the usual
places, and to arrest all suspected persons of those counties and commit them to prison till further
order.”152 Commissions from March order John Bourghchier and Robert Hungerford to “call together the
knights, esquires, gentlemen and other notable persons of Surrey to resist the rebels who have divers
times entered Sandwich and other parts of Kent.”153
Patent roll entries directed towards certain cities tend to provide more information than
commissions of array at the county level. A commission sent to the mayor, sheriff, and bailiffs of Bristol
in February instructed the recipients to “call together all armed and fencible men and archers in Bristol”
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against the rebels and to “exhort the king’s lieges of Bristol to find a competent number of able men and
archers to attend about the king’s person at the costs of the said town.”154 Another commission went to
Walter Scull and Thomas Throgmarton which instructed them to “stay on the safe-keeping and defence
of Worcester and to defend that city” against rebels “who intend to enter divers parts of England and
subjugate cities, castle, fortified towns and fortalices and hold them against the king.”155 The
commission also required these local officials to “keep the king’s lieges of that city armed and arrayed
and put them on the walls and at the gates and bridge thereof.”156 Several more commissions went out
in late April. One commission of array was sent to the mayor and bailiff of Winchelsea to resist rebels
“and the king’s adversaries of France, who purpose to enter the said town.”157 Another went to the
authorities in Southampton and included instructions to “fortify the walls and make defences called
‘loupes’ thereon, and to appoint watches, scouts and keepers of the gates day and night.”158
Henry VI continued to send out commissions throughout the year. On April 28th, Henry VI sent
commissions to numerous counties instructing the recipients to “call together and lead all persons…
able to labour, as soon as they hear that [the Yorkists] enter the realm or cause to be made any
congregations, combinations or unlawful gatherings, and to resist the said rebels.”159 Apparently, the
citizens of Norfolk proved less-than-cooperative. In late May, the king commissioned William Calthorp
and several others complaining that “divers lieges of Norfolk… have been wont to make watches for the
safety of the king’s lieges there” and “refuse to do so.”160 The commission instructed the recipients to
“cause all such to make such watches according to the ordinance of king Edward, and to compel by
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distraints all who refuse.”161 Commissions sent out in June instructed the recipients to arrest and
imprison rebels, and to “call together all lieges” in their respective jurisdictions “to go against the said
rebels and all who resist them herein.”162
Similar methods were used to raise soldiers in Wales, where the king delegated military
authority to his son, the prince of Wales, and to other officers. In February, the Crown commissioned
the prince of Wales, the duke of Cornwall, and the earl of Chester to “take into the king’s hands all the
possessions late of Richard, duke of York, Richard, earl of Warwick, and Richard, earl of Salisbury,
traitors and rebels, in Wales and the march there, and to cause a competent number of men at arms
and others to be put therein to guard the same.”163 He also sent a commission of array to Jasper, earl of
Pembroke to “take the muster of the men at arms and archers of the parts adjacent to the castle [of
Denbygh] and other parts of Wales.”164 The commission included power to “admit into the king’s grace
any rebels in Denbygh castle willing to submit thereto, except any English and Irish holding that or any
other castle or fortalice, who are to be taken by him at the king’s will, and except certain Welshmen,
outlawed and attainted, to be taken and committed to prison.”165 This commission also included the
legal authority to “judge and execute all rebels and traitors in the said parts.”166 This explicit delegation
of authority suggests that such powers were usually reserved by the Crown, but were being delegated to
the earl of Pembroke for the sake of expediency.
The power of the Crown is explicit in these records. In addition to projecting royal authority
through commissions of array, the Crown made sure to note instances of defiance. If the people of a
given locality were reluctant to obey royal commands, the Crown sent commissioners to enforce its will
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with the threat of imprisonment. Outright rebellion could be punished by imprisonment or death. The
authority to administer these punishments came from the Crown.
Loyal service, on the other hand, was rewarded. Several entries provide valuable insight into
how the king expected to fund armies and reward supporters during this period. In February 1460, the
king preemptively rewarded Jasper “for good service in besieging the castle of Denbigh and crushing the
rebels therein” with a grant of “all moveable goods of such rebels in the castle, when it be reduced, to
distribute at his discretion to such as give their services herein.”167 The king also granted the prince of
Wales “500 marks yearly for life from the issues of the lordships of Uske, Caerlion, Glomorgan,
Morgannok and Bergeveny, to the intent that knights and esquires may be retained with the king and
prince, so far as the said sum will extend, by whose money and power the said lordships [under rebel
control] may be brought back the more speedily to the king’s obedience.”168 In March, the king granted
the earl of Pembroke 1,000 marks “to support his charges in the recovery of Denbigh castle and other
castles, lordships and manors in Wales and the march thereof, now in the hands of the rebels, from the
issues of the lordships of Denbigh, Radnore, Nerberd, Paynescastell, Elwell, Evyas, Mellennyth and
Guerthrenyan.”169 The prince of Wales received a grant of 1,000£ from the issues of Usk, Karlyon,
Glomorgan, Morgannok, Bergevenny, Beaudeley, Ludlowe, Fawnehop, and Wyggemore for the same
reason.170 To compensate Humphrey, duke of Buckingham for his expenses “in attendance upon the
king in his journey in Kent against the rebels there and in the suppression of other rebels,” the king
granted him the fines owed by Walter Devereux, William Hastings, and Walter Hopton.171 An entry
dated March 22nd shows that the king still owed the duke 300£ “for his expenses in suppressing the
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rebels.”172 This entry voided the previous grant and instead repaid the duke by granting him the keeping
of various lands forfeited by the duke of York “to hold until he be satisfied of the said sum and of
200l.”173 It also granted “all sums pertaining to the king by reason of the recognizance made in Chancery
whereby Walter Devereux late of Webley, co. Hereford, esquire is bound to the king in 500 marks for his
rebellion.”174
These records demonstrate that the Crown was capable of diverting funds from a variety of
sources. From the center, the Crown could fund military forces and reward loyal supporters through the
Exchequer, through local revenue streams, by imposing fines, or by redistributing the lands and titles of
wealthy rebels. The coordination of these financial resources required a centralized administration
capable of keeping track of them all and commanding the obedience of the royal officials and local
authorities who directly managed them. Furthermore, the Crown’s ability to take away lands and titles is
indicative of its power over even the most powerful of its noble subjects.
The impressment of ships remained an important feature of the civil wars of this period,
especially considering the naval threat presented by the earl of Warwick because of his role as keeper of
the sea. Throughout February and March of 1460, Henry VI impressed ships and mariners in the familiar
fashion to provide for naval defense. In February, he commissioned men to “arrest the ships and vessels
necessary for the conduct of an army ordered to go on the sea for the safe keeping thereof, and masters
and mariners for the same.”175 Henry Coventre and John Barker were tasked with procuring mariners for
two specific ships, “le Giles of Hull and Houghtons Barge.”176 In March, the king commissioned on of his
sergeants-at-arms, Thomas Osbern, to “arrest mariners called ‘galymen’ necessary for the conduct of

172

Ibid., 552.
Ibid.
174
Ibid.
175
Ibid., 563.
176
Ibid.
173

41
certain galleys of James, earl of Wiltshire, in the port of Suthampton.”177 Another commission appointed
Simon Hammes to purvey victuals and “arrest masters and mariners” for a ship called la Marie “to serve
at the king’s wages.”178 Two other commissions from late March call for the impressment of ships as
well as “masters and mariners therefor.”179
These ships were to serve with soldiers under the command of the duke of Exeter and Baldwin
Fulford. The abovementioned commission to Simon Hammes notes that la Marie was “about to serve
the king in the company of Henry, duke of Exeter, in conducting an army ordained to go on the safekeeping of the sea, for the money of the duke.”180 Another commission from late March instructed
William Ballard, “herald at arms of Henry, duke of Exeter, to purvey 3 shots of ‘cables’ for the duke’s
money for the ship called le Grace Dieu, about to go on the sea to resist the king’s enemies, which is
destitute of ‘cables.’”181 Evidently the force was ready in May, when the king sent a commission to
Thomas Kiriell, John Cheyne, and others to “take near Sandwich the muster of all men at arms and
archers ordered to go with Henry, duke of Exeter, on the safe-keeping of the sea to resist the king’s
rebels and enemies.”182 On March 4th, the king commissioned men to take muster of “Baldwin Fulford,
knight, and the men at arms and archers of his retinue, going on the safe keeping of the sea.”183 This
naval force was intended to counter the earl of Warwick. On March 26th, the king sent a mandate to
“the customers and the searcher in the port of Suthampton” instructing them to “permit the captains,
patrons, merchants, pilots, galleymen, sailors and mariners of any carracks and galleys in the said port,
arrested to serve the king against an army of Richard, earl of Warwick, and his accomplices on the sea,
to unlade the said carracks and galleys of all goods and merchandise therein without search or forfeiture
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thereof.”184 Furthermore, anyone “arrested to serve on the sea against Richard, earl of Warwick and his
accomplices” received a pardon “of all trespasses and offences in shipping merchandise in the said
vessels contrary to statutes, and all consequent forfeitures.”185
Henry VI was captured by the Yorkists in July 1460. Because he was still the reigning king,
commissions sent out in the period from July 1460 until Richard of York’s death in December 1460 bear
Henry VI’s name but they were executing Yorkist policies. In effect, possession of the king gave the
rebels control over the administrative machinery of the government. Consequently, the commissions
demonstrate that the Yorkists used the same centralized administration to raise men for defense. In
August, the earl of Salisbury was commissioned to “call together all the king’s lieges and subjects of the
counties of York, Nottingham, Derby, Cumberland, Westmoreland, Northumberland and Lincoln to go to
the rescue of the castle of Rokesburgh and the town of Berewike, besieged by James, king of Scots, who
has entered the marches towards Scotland with a great army.”186 Orders to the sheriffs of those
counties instructed them to “cause proclamation to be made” in their bailiwicks that “all lieges of the
king… able to labour” are to cooperate with the earl.187 Commissions sent later in the year in November
and December instructed the recipients to arrest and imprison rebels, “and if they resist, to call together
all lieges of [their counties] and other counties adjacent to fight them.”188 Similar commissions
instructing the recipients to “call together all lieges” within their jurisdictions went out throughout
January and February of 1461.189
During this period leading up to the Battle of Towton in March 1461, the administrative powers
of the Crown were being invoked by both factions. Several of these commissions suggest that there was

184

Ibid., 606.
Ibid., 591.
186
Ibid., 589.
187
Ibid., 612.
188
Ibid., 651-652, 653.
189
Ibid., 655-659.
185

43
resistance from the local population. One orders the arrest of “all persons in Norfolk and Suffolk who
impede the king’s lieges in coming to defend the king’s person pursuant to the king’s ordinance of
late.”190 Another instructs the aldermen and burgesses of Stanford to “take muster of the said lieges
within the precinct of the town, punishing by imprisonment or fine all who refuse herein.”191 Several
other entries call for the arrest of those who “hinder the king’s lieges from coming to defend his person”
and almost all of them proclaim the criminality of assisting rebels with supplies or victuals.192 The earl of
Warwick also reclaimed his role as keeper of the sea during this uncertain period. The Crown granted
the appointment in December 1460.193 Just a few weeks before, the king commissioned the mayors and
bailiffs of Dartmouth, Plymouth, and Fowey to “arrest a ship called la Mare Clyffe of Dertemouth and all
other ships and vessels in the said ports necessary for the retinue of Richard, earl of Warwick, ordained
to go on the sea to resist the king’s enemies.”194 The commission included instructions to “purvey
habiliments and tackling therefor for the earl’s money” and to “arrest masters and mariners for the
governance thereof and set them aboard at the earl’s wages.”195
Beginning in March 1461, Edward IV was the reigning king and Henry VI was a rebel who had
escaped into Lancastrian custody. At this point, the Yorkists controlled the Crown’s administrative
systems. The new king’s first military concern was securing his position by the quick reduction of rebels
who were still holding out in fortified places. Early in March, the king sent commissions to various
counties to “array all ablebodied men… for defence against Henry VI and his adherents and the king’s
enemies of France and Scotland, and to arrest and imprison rebels.”196 Later that month, he
commissioned Geoffrey Gate and William Glover to “fortify the castle of Corff, co. Dorset, and hold it
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against the rebels.”197 In April, he commissioned John Wenlok to “summon the gentry and others of the
counties of Northampton, Bedford, Buckingham, Cambridge and Huntingdon to assist him to besiege the
castle of Thorpwaterfeld.”198 The following month, the king commissioned Robert Ogle to “take into the
king’s hands his castle of Harebotell and lordship of Reddesdale and also the castle of Forde and other
possessions late of John Heron of Forde, knight, deceased, and to seize Roger, son and heir of John, and
keep the same; and to crush any of the county of Northumberland who may resist.”199 Similar
commissions instructing men to take possessions “into the king’s hands” and subdue rebels went out
throughout the first months of Edward IV’s reign.200 July 8th commissions to Walter Devereux and others
to “array all ablebodied men in the counties of Hereford, Gloucester, and Salop, for defence against the
king’s enemies of France and Scotland, and the adherents of Henry VI and Margaret his wife.”201
As this last entry demonstrates, the new king also needed to defend against foreign invasion. In
May, the king issued a writ of aid to “all sheriffs, mayors and others of the king’s castle of Caresbroke,
lordships and island of Wight, and the counties of Southampton, Sussex and Surrey, for Geoffrey Gate,
whom the king has appointed lieutenant, keeper and governor of the said castle, lordship and island.”202
Another commission addressed to Geoffrey Gate, the abbot of Quarre, and others instructed the
recipients to “assemble the king’s subjects of the said island and the counties of Southampton, Surrey
and Sussex for defence of the castle and island against the king’s enemies of France and others, should
they attempt an invasion.”203 Gate himself was commissioned to “defend the said castle of Caresbroke
and lordship and island of Wight, to summon the inhabitants of the island and others for watches and
other accustomed services for defence when necessary, and to seize and imprison rebels; and

197

Ibid.
Ibid., 28.
199
Ibid., 29.
200
Ibid., 30-31.
201
Ibid., 36.
202
Ibid., 37-38.
203
Ibid., 38.
198

45
appointment of him as receiver of the castle, lordship and island, to collect all rents and profits and
account for them at the Exchequer after allowance for fees to himself and his soldiers.”204 The same
month, the king commissioned John Audeley, William Bourghchier, and John Sourton to “urge the king’s
subjects of the counties of Southampton, Wilts, Somerset, Dorset, Cornwall and Devon to resist the
king’s enemies of France who have entered the island of Guernesey and besieged his castle of Cornet
there.”205
In August, the king sent commissions to authorities in various counties, with the earl of Warwick
included as a recipient on each commission, instructing the recipients to “urge the king’s subjects [of
each county] to array a force at their own expense for defence of the county and the adjoining parts of
Wales against the rebels, to be at Hereford on the Nativity of the Virgin.”206 In November, the king
commissioned the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester, the earl of Warwick, and others to “array all the
king’s subjects” in Cumberland, Northumberland, York, and Westmoreland “for defence against his
enemies of Scotland and Henry VI and Margaret his wife and their adherents.”207 The same month, a
commission to the mayor, sheriffs, and aldermen of Norwich ordered the recipients to “collect divers
sums of money assessed and granted by the city for the expenses of certain armed men going in the
name of the city to resist the rebels in the north when the king was there.”208 In October, a commission
was sent to the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk and others to “take the castle of Bokenham, co. Norfolk,
into the king’s hands and remove John Knyvet and William Knyver, esquires, from the custody thereof
and arrest and imprison any who resist.”209
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Coastal defense also remained a high priority for the new government. In May, Edward IV
installed the earl of Warwick as “constable of the king’s castle of Dover” and warden of the Cinque
Ports, granting “all rents and services called ‘castelwarde,’ and herbage and advowsons pertaining to the
same…, all forfeitures, ‘shares,’ wreck of sea and other profits; and also 300l yearly for the sustenance of
himself and priests, servants, watchmen and other officers there, in the same manner as Humphrey, late
duke of Gloucester, viz. 146l from the wards pertaining to the castle and 154l from the fee farm of the
town of Southampton.”210 The following month, the king began raising a fleet. In June, he sent a
commission to the abbot of St. John’s and other clerics to “urge the king’s subjects of the counties of
Suffolk, Essex and Hertford to raise a fleet for the king against his enemies of France and Scotland, after
the example of the men of York and Scarburgh and other places in the north, who have provided it for
half a year at their own expense, to find six ships fully equipped with men at arms and archers to the
number of 700, and to take the ships’ victuals and stores.”211 In July, Edward IV commissioned eight
men to “take ships, masters and mariners, for the king’s fleet.”212 Another commission to William
Bourgchier and others ordered the recipients to “urge the king’s subjects of the north parts of the
county of Devon to supply ships well equipped with men, victuals and habiliments of war for half a year
at their own expense for defence against the king’s enemies of France and elsewhere, after the example
of other subjects of the king in various parts; and to appoint persons to collect money and other supplies
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thus granted and to take ships and men and equipment as above.”213 Like commissions were sent to
ranking clerics in the other parts of Devon, Wilts, and Southampton.214
These commissions are interesting, as most of them suggest that Edward IV wanted the
voluntary participation of the leading men in the localities. Apart from simply “taking” ships and
mariners, the commissioners were tasked with “urging” the local population to provide ships to serve at
their own expense. The use of abbots and other clerics in the matter seems to support the idea that the
king wanted to persuade the localities rather than coerce them. This may have been a way for the new
king to gauge the level of support he could expect from his subjects. On the other hand, Edward may
have simply been attempting to defray the expenses of raising a fleet by calling for voluntary
contributions. In any case, Edward IV did not rely exclusively on the goodwill of his subjects. Several of
the commissions called for impressment in the usual fashion.
As these records demonstrate, the new king made extensive use of the existing royal systems to
mobilize forces against rebels and foreign enemies. Very quickly after taking the throne, Edward IV was
able to place loyal Yorkists in important administrative positions and use them to mobilize troops, ships,
and other resources against his enemies. The speed at which the new king was able to take over the
Crown’s administrative systems was made possible by several factors. First, the centralized
administrative structure of the Crown had solid foundations capable of withstanding changes in
management. In other words, the system was already in place and did not depend on the identity of the
man sitting on the throne. Second, the authority of the Crown had never been challenged. The Yorkists
had been invoking the authority of the Crown throughout the course of their rebellion against the
government of Henry VI. This meant that the Yorkists already had numerous loyal supporters
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performing administrative functions related to mobilization. Once Edward IV became king, the activities
of these men began to appear in the patent rolls and close rolls.
The overall system of mobilization for domestic conflict and coastal defense remained the same
when Edward IV began raising forces for a campaign against rebels at St. Michael’s Mount in 1473. In
October of that year, the king commissioned John Arundel and numerous others to “array the king’s
lieges of the county of Cornwall, and of other counties adjacent if necessary, to conquer John, late earl
of Oxford, and other rebels who have entered St. Michael’s Mount, co. Cornwall, and to bring back the
mount into the king’s hands and provide for its safe-custody and defence.”215 On December 7, the king
granted John Fortescu and others “full power and authority to reduce St. Michael’s Mount" and
“conquer John, late earl of Oxford, and others who have entered the mount and hold it as a refuge and
make excursions from thence to the adjoining parts.”216 The commission allowed them to “promise
pardon to any rebels within the mount who may be willing to submit and take an oath of fealty, with the
exception of the said earl, William Beaumond, late lord Bardolf, knight, and George Veers, Thomas Veer
and Richard Veer, brothers of the earl.”217 A few days later, Richard Patyn and Richard Veron were
appointed to “take carriage by land and sea and fresh water for divers ordnance which the king has
ordered to be taken to St. Michael’s Mount against the rebels there and timber and iron and other
necessaries for the same and carpenters called ‘whelewrightes’ and ‘cartwrightes’ and other
carpenters.”218 Supporting this land force with a naval force would not require much innovation. In
November 1473, the king commissioned shipmasters to procure mariners for four ships “which the king
has ordered to go to sea with other ships to resist his enemies.”219 Whether these ships were intended
for supporting operations at St. Michael’s Mount is unclear. However, the entry demonstrates that there
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was always a ready supply of ships available for “resisting the king’s enemies.” These ships, or any other
ships already serving for coastal defense, could have been diverted to aid at St. Michael’s Mount or any
other military operation as needed.
Garrisons and Strongholds
The English garrison system was a crucial aspect of military organization during the fifteenth
century. Despite losing most of its continental possessions by 1453, the Crown managed to hold the
Calais marches throughout this period. The king maintained a garrison at Calais itself as well as smaller
garrisons at Risbank Tower and the castles of Guines and Hammes located nearby within the Calais pale.
Additionally, there were English garrisons on the channel islands of Jersey and Guernsey. On the other
side of the channel, there was a garrison on the Isle of Wight. In the north, there were the marches
towards Scotland. In that region, the Crown maintained multiple fortified towns and other fortifications
under the command of the wardens of the marches. The English kings also kept smaller English garrisons
in Wales and Ireland in addition to the smaller castles which existed throughout the realm. All of these
garrisons and strongholds received varying degrees of royal attention during this period.
The military and political importance of the Calais garrison during the Wars of the Roses has
received considerable scholarly attention. It was from Calais, after all, that the earl of Warwick
conducted military operations against Henry VI in 1459 and 1460.220 David Grummitt provides an indepth discussion about Calais in his book The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 14361558. He explains that Calais, Risbank, Guines, and Hammes each had its own garrison. The crown filled
the garrisons by indenting with captains, who in turn provided the necessary numbers of men-at-arms
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and archers.221 As Grummitt writes, “Just as the king indented with the captain, so the captain, free by
the terms of his indenture and grant of office to recruit his own retinue to fulfil his obligation to the
crown, could indent with lesser captains and they, in turn, could indent with the men who would serve
as soldiers.”222
The greatest difference between garrisons and other forces raised via indenture was the
method of payment. Those serving within the garrisons of the Calais marches were accounted for by a
royal officer, who held the title of treasurer of Calais. Garrison soldiers who wanted to maintain their
place in the garrison but go on leave could also privately hire other soldiers to serve for “petty wages,”
meaning that they served outside of the purview of the treasurer.223 Additionally, in times of war or
heightened danger, the regular garrisons were augmented with temporary “crews” of reinforcements.224
Such additional forces were not paid by the treasurer of Calais either.225 Rather, payment for crews
followed the model described concerning payment of expeditionary forces. The crown indented with a
captain, paid him for a certain number of men-at-arms and archers, and left the maintenance of the
retinue to him.
Funding for the Calais garrisons during this period was made possible by the wool trade, which
passed through Calais to the Low Countries. As Grummitt states, “The costs of the defence of Calais
were met by the profits of the English wool trade; indeed, the decision to move the wool staple to Calais
in Edward III’s reign was governed by the need to pay for the newly acquired Pale…”226 There was even a
mint established there in 1363 “to turn the profits of that trade into coin with which to pay the
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garrison.”227 Grummitt explains how Edward IV sought to reinforce the role of the staple as the source of
funding for the Calais garrison with multiple acts of retainer—one in 1466 and another in 1473.
Grummitt writes, “the king ‘retained’ the services of the merchants as the financiers of his town and
marches; in return the staplers received royal protection for their trade and, as far as possible, a foreign
policy favourable to mercantile interests.”228 Grants of customs revenue to the merchants of the staple
appear frequently in the records leading up to this point, as both Henry VI and Edward IV relied on the
staple to pay the wages of the garrison.
The patent rolls demonstrate that the Crown remained active in the administration of Calais
throughout this period. In the early 1450s, Henry VI was still preparing to defend Calais against the
French. In July 1452, he granted protection to John Cheyne and his possessions “in consideration of his
diligence in the purveyance of victuals and the repairs at Calais, so long as he stay in the office of
victualler.”229 In September 1453, the king commissioned three men to “arrest carpenters for the
working of timber bought for the works at Calais, and to take carriage therefor to the seacoast where
they can best be shipped, and to set the carpenters to work.”230 In April 1454, the king commissioned
Richard Wyderton and Thomas Stones to take “the muster of Henry Belknap and the men at arms and
archers ordered to go with him to the defence of Guysnes castle.”231 In June, the king also commissioned
Henry, viscount Bourgchier, to “take muster of Leo de Welles, knight, and Richard Wodevyle of Revers,
knight, deputies of Edmund, duke of Somerset, lieutenant of the town and castle of Calais, the tower of
Rysbanke and the marches there, and of the men at arms and archers of their retinue and of the soldiers
of Calais, in any suitable place near Calais.”232
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Henry VI continued to issue orders related to Calais during the last years of his first reign. In
February 1459, the he appointed Henry Yong as constable of Guines castle, “with 8d a day for his wages,
8d a day for each of four foot soldiers at arms and 6d a day for each of six archers from the issues of the
lordship or county of Guysnes by the hands of the treasurer of Calais or the receivers of the lordship,
and with a dwelling called ‘le Storehous’ and ‘le Artry’ in the castle, and all other profits.”233 In April, the
king indented with Richard Tunstall, appointing him “master and maker of his moneys of gold and silver
in the Tower of London in England and in Caleys.”234 The following month, William Whitlok, “late
lieutenant of John, lord of Stourton, captain of the tower of Risbank,” was granted 122£ 9s 4 1/4d per
year from the “issues of the lordships of Mark and Oye in Picardy.”235 The grant states that this was to
serve as repayment of a total of 367£ 7s 9 3/4d, “whereof 277£ 7s 9 3/4d are due to [Whitlok] for his
wages… and 90l are due to him of the wages of Fulk Vernon, captain of Hammes castle.”236
The rebellion of the earl of Warwick put Calais at risk, and the king endeavored to bolster
Lancastrian forces there in 1460. In March, Henry VI appointed Andrew Trolop as “bailiff of Guysnes and
the marches thereof” as a reward for “good service in the wars” and compensation for the “loss of his
goods in Calais taken by the rebels.”237 That May, Osbert Mountford and John Baker were “ordered… to
bring 200 men at arms and archers to Henry, duke of Somerset, for the safe-keeping and defence of the
castle and town of Guysnes and to resist the king’s rebels and enemies, appointing them to arrest ships
and vessels necessary herein and masters and mariners therefor.”238 Thomas Thorp, Thomas Kyryell,
John Cheyne, and others were tasked with taking the muster of this force.239
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After taking the throne in 1461, Edward IV appointed numerous officers to serve at Calais.
Walter Blount became the treasurer of Calais in March.240 In August, the king appointed John Martyn as
“clerk of the works of the castle and walls of the king’s town of Calais and the waters there.”241 The
same month, John Spevy, described as a “soldier of Calais,” received the “office of purveyor of timber
for the king’s works in Calais and carriage for the same.”242 In November, Edward IV appointed Thomas
Clampard as “chief smith of the town of Calais and the marches there, and surveyor of the smith’s art
there.”243 The following month, he granted Thurston Hatfeld the “office of the serjeanty of Guysnes in
Picardy.”244 In February 1468, the king granted Edmund Childerhous and William Alberd the “office of
the king’s artillery within the town of Calais.”245 March 1472, Edward IV granted Giles can Rassyngham,
smith of Calais, “the reversion of the offices of master smith and master gunner of the said town of
Calais and the marches of the same on the death, surrender or forfeiture of Thomas Clampard or other
occupiers.”246
As others have remarked, the Calais garrison was the closest thing the English Crown had to a
standing army. The information contained within the patent rolls and close rolls suggests that the
Crown’s administration of Calais was thorough. There were numerous royal offices related to the
maintenance of the garrison there, all of which were filled and funded by the Crown. Even in periods of
civil war, the garrison remained loyal to whoever wielded the Crown’s authority. For instance, when the
Yorkists brought them to Ludford Bridge to fight against Henry VI in 1459, the Calais soldiers refused to
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fight. The intricate royal administration of the Calais garrison and the loyalty of its soldiers is testament
to the enduring power of the Crown, as an institution, during this period.
The existence of a number of other garrisons outside of Calais further emphasizes the Crown’s
authority over military matters. Outside of the Calais marches, there were the garrisons situated on
islands in the channel. These garrisons were smaller than the ones at Calais, which meant that the king
did not need to administer them directly as often. In September 1452, Henry VI appointed John Nanfan
as “warden and governor of the isles of Gersey and Gernesey and the castles and other fortalices within
the same for half a year and thereafter for five years.”247 This included Nanfan’s appointment as
“collector and receiver of all customs, subsidies and other pence due to the king by the inhabitants of
the islands” as well as power to “rule and govern all the king’s subjects and other inhabitants…, to
punish delinquents, to grant safe-conducts…, to appoint and remove officers, to enquire touching crimes
and correct the same and to appoint justices in eyre for assizes.”248 John Neweburgh and John Fyloll
were appointed to take the muster of Nanfan’s force of 130 archers at Poole before it departed to the
islands.249 As the patent roll entry makes clear, the king delegated a lot of power onto Nanfan as a
projection of the Crown’s authority over the islands.
The Crown’s administration of the garrison on the Isle of Wight was not much different. In
October 1457, the king granted Henry, the duke of Somerset, the “lieutenancy and keeping of the isle
and lordship of Wight and the castle and lordship of Caresbrook.”250 In December 1460, with Henry VI in
Yorkist hands, Geoffrey Gate received the position of “lieutenant, keeper and governor of Caresbroke
castle and the lordship and isle of Wyght, to defend the castle, lordship and isle against the king’s
adversaries of France and any rebels, and to compel the inhabitants of the island and all others to keep
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watches and to discharge all persons from the keeping of the castle, lordship and isle for the safer
keeping thereof.”251 The commission included power to arrest and imprison anyone who resisted Gate’s
assumption of his office.252 In March 1465, Edward IV appointed Gate as “the king’s lieutenant of the Isle
of Wight and the castle and lordship of Caresbroke within the island,” granting him “all manors,
lordships, lands, rents, services, woods and revenues belonging to the king within the island.”253
According to the patent roll entry, Gate had been “bearing the burden of the payment of the wages of
men-at-arms and archers there” and even “released to the king the sum of 347£ 8s due for the wages of
himself and other men-at-arms and archers of his retinue and taken upon himself the safe-custody and
governance of the island, castle and lordship at his own expense.”254
There were also several garrisons spread throughout the marches towards Scotland. The patent
roll entries regarding these garrisons show that the Crown filled them via indentures and funded them
with customs revenues and other local sources of income. According to a patent roll entry from March
1455, Henry VI had indented with William Neville and Ralph Gray for their services as “wardens of the
castle of Rokesburgh from 1 March, 30 Henry VI, for twelve years.”255 The two men were to receive
1,000£ per year in peacetime and 2,000£ per year in wartime “by the hands of the treasurer of
England.”256 However, Henry VI’s government found a different method of paying the garrison, drawing
from the customs revenue of Newcastle upon Tyne at the beginning of each quarter.257 In May 1459, the
king responded to a petition from “the mayor and burgesses of Berwick upon Tweed shewing the
necessity of repairing the walls of the town and castle of Berwick.”258 To address the problem, the king
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granted 100£ per year from Berwick’s customs revenue to the clerk of the works for six years.259 The
money was “to be spent on such repair by survey of the mayor.”260 In November, Henry VI owed the earl
of Northumberland 16,985£ 5s 7 1/4d “for the keeping of the castle and town of Berwick upon Tweed
and the east march towards Scotland.”261 To repay this debt, the king granted the earl authority to
collect yearly funds from the issues of numerous local sources.262
Edward IV also paid arrears of wages to garrison troops with customs revenue. An entry from
March 1465 notes that John Neville had served as “warden and guardian of the East Marches of England
towards Scotland,” paying 8,000£ “for wages and regards of captains and soldiers.”263 However, he had
only received 6,000£ from the king.264 To pay the additional 2,000£ of arrears, the king granted the earl
all customs revenue from Newcastle upon Tyne to the value of 2,000£.265 A patent roll entry from
January 1466 explains that Edward IV retained the earl of Warwick as “captain and guardian of the
castle and town of Carlisle and the west marches of Scotland for 20 years from 4 March, 1 Edward IV”
via indenture.266 The earl was to receive 2,500£ per year in wartime and 1,250£ per year in peacetime
“at the hands of the treasurer of England and the chamberlains of the Exchequer.”267 The king instructed
the earl to receive as much of his wages as possible from the customs revenue from Kingston upon Hull,
“rendering yearly his account at the Exchequer for any surplus” and receiving “what may be lacking
yearly at the receipt of the Exchequer.”268
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The administration and funding of these garrisons by the Crown is familiar. The king appointed
men to lead and maintain the garrisons, paying them according to agreements reminiscent of those
used to raise expeditionary forces. Funding for the garrisons came from a variety of sources controlled
by the Crown. Apart from paying the wages owed to the wardens of these garrisons, the Crown funded
the maintenance of fortifications by diverting customs revenue.
Additionally, the Crown kept records of individual men serving in these garrisons. The patent
rolls contain numerous entries marking the revocation of protections which the Crown had granted to
individuals recruited to serve in English garrisons. These entries refer to men who were granted
protections but ultimately did not follow through with their service. They are short and formulaic, but
they are a useful means of tracking royal interest in certain garrisons. The following is an entry from
November 1452:
Revocation of protection with clause volumus for one year granted on 3 July last to Walter Piers
late of Adescompe, co. Surrey, the younger, ‘husbondman,’ as having stayed in the company of
Henry Percy, lord of Ponyges, captain of the castle and town of Berwick on Tweed in the
marches of Scotland, on the safe-keeping and victualling thereof; because he tarries at Croydon,
co. Surrey, as Thomas Yerd, the sheriff, has certified.269
Entries such as this appear frequently throughout the patent rolls of this period. Almost all of them refer
to garrison service in places like Calais, Jersey, Ireland, and the marches towards Scotland. They also
tend to appear in groups, highlighting the importance of a particular garrison at that moment in time.
For instance, multiple entries referring to service under John Nanfan appear in early 1453, soon after his
appointment as warden there.270 Another group of entries from late 1453 and early 1454 refers to men
who were supposed to serve under Thomas Fyndern at Guines castle and John Marny at Hammes
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castle.271 The records from Edward IV’s reign are similar in this regard. The patent rolls from 1461 to
1467 contain numerous entries regarding men who were supposed to serve at Calais. The records from
1467 to 1477 have a preponderance of entries related to service in Ireland, with 1475 showing a group
of entries regarding men who were supposed to serve under various royal officers in France.
The usefulness of these entries is limited, considering the fact that they are revocations of
protections which had previously been granted. However, their frequency and formulaic nature
throughout the reigns of two kings suggests a degree of standardization in garrison administration. They
all name the officer under whom the prospective soldier was supposed to serve. For smaller garrisons
like Jersey, this was the warden. For larger ones like Calais, which had various officers including captain,
treasurer, and victualler, the entry specified one. The nature of the service is always described as
defensive, including victualling as a basic aspect of service.
Furthermore, these entries show that the Crown relied on local authorities to keep track of
individuals who had taken letters of protection. If an individual failed to follow through with his service,
the king found out through the administrative ties between the central government and the localities.
Without loyal service from local officials, the crown would have no way of knowing which letters of
protection needed to be revoked and which needed to be honored. The fact that so many revocations
are recorded demonstrates the far-reaching power of the Crown via loyal agents in the localities.
Overall, the administration of the English garrison system appears to have been standardized by
the 1450s. The Crown filled garrisons by indenting with captains and funded them with local sources of
revenue. For larger garrisons, the Crown appointed officers like treasurers and victuallers. The king
could also support garrisons by granting additional funding, purveying materials, or sending
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reinforcements. Individuals recruited to serve in garrisons could request letters of protection from the
Crown, and the king kept track of these men to ensure that they served. All of this is evidence of a
strong Crown presiding over a robust central administration.

60

IV. ORDNANCE, MANPOWER, AND PROVISIONS
Administering and Mobilizing the King’s Ordnance
The mobilization of weaponry, laborers, and other specialists was another feature of warfare
which required a robust central administration. During the fifteenth century, the Crown controlled a
royal armory within the Tower of London as well as smaller armories located throughout the realm. The
military role of the Tower in particular has received some scholarly attention. Dan Spencer highlights the
importance of the Tower to the production of gunpowder weapons in the 1470s. He notes that the
majority of English guns were produced “outside the premises of the Tower” during the 1450s, but that
“the accession of Edward IV to the throne in 1461 resulted in the Tower once again becoming an
important centre for the production and storage of artillery.”272 Spencer suggests that this development
was “due to the establishment of the office of the Master of the Ordnance on a permanent basis there
for the first time” as well as the new king’s “desire to acquire an impressive artillery train.”273 By 1467,
the Crown kept its ordnance in the Tower to be maintained and deployed as needed.274 Using the
records of John Wode, Edward IV’s master of ordnance, Spencer demonstrates that “Tower workshops
were busy in the early 1470s, with much of the work carried out onsite rather than elsewhere.”275 As a
center of storage and production, the Tower became “firmly established as the primary centre in
England for the royal ordnance by 1472, which meant that it played a key part in the supply of firearms
for subsequent expeditions to France and Scotland.”276
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Henry VI was using the Tower as an armory in May 1453, even if it was not producing large
numbers of cannons. That month, the king granted Thomas West and John Roger the “office of keeper
of the armoury within the Tower of London” upon the death of John Malepas.277 West and Roger were
to receive “wages of 7 1/2d a day from the issues of Kent and all other usual profits” in addition to “a
robe of the suit of the yeomen of the chamber yearly against Christmas, and a dwelling within the Tower
opposite the tower in which are kept the rolls of Chancery.”278 Furthermore, the Crown controlled other
armories located throughout the realm. In July, John Roger and Mordan Meredith were granted the
“office of keeper of the armoury of all castles of the king in South Wales… notwithstanding that there
are no armouries in all or any of the said castles at present.”279 For this office, Roger and Meredith were
to receive “the usual wages and fees by the hands of the chamberlain of South Wales.”280 Later that
month, the king granted Henry Werham and William Wetnale the “offices of keeping the armour and
artillery within the castle of Pountefrete, co. York… with the usual wages, fees and profits from the
revenues of the lordship of Pountefrete.”281
The extent to which the English kings invested in and used gunpowder weapons during this
period has received some attention from military historians. Specifically, historians have argued about
the reason for the “perceived ‘lack of use’ of gunpowder weapons” by the English during the domestic
fighting of the Wars of the Roses.282 John Gillingham argues that this lack of use is explained by the
prevalence of decisive battles over sieges in domestic campaigns.283 Kelly DeVries argues against this
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explanation, as well as Anthony Goodman’s suggestion that armies were mobilized too quickly to allow
for substantial artillery trains.284 Instead, DeVries argues that there was a “loss of centralized control
over these weapons… and a rise of local control in its place.”285 He suggests that this process began
during the minority of Henry VI, “when historians remark that there was a breakdown in administrative
centralization.”286 He also suggests that a large number of guns may have been lost along with the
majority of England’s other continental possessions when France finally fell in the early 1450s.287
DeVries’ writes:
At the same time, and generally unrecorded in contemporary sources, there seems to have been
a concerted and successful effort to acquire guns by various local entities in England. Why this
occurred and whether such actions were purposely hidden from royal notice cannot be known.
What can be known is that from the very outset of the Wars of the Roses every local entity
which could afford gunpowder weapons, greater nobles, lesser nobles, and towns, had them,
and when necessary used them.288
After a summary of the use of gunpowder weapons during the Wars of the Roses, including Edward IV’s
vigor in improving the royal armament, DeVries asserts that “local ownership of gunpowder weapons
almost always equaled if not surpassed that of the central, royal government.”289 He provides numerous
examples of guns being used in private feuds without royal involvement, guns being provided for public
service by private individuals, and guns being used by towns.290
While these examples do demonstrate that guns were in the hands of towns and individuals,
they do not necessarily demonstrate a lack of centralized administration. There are several problems
with DeVries’ argument. First, the idea that there was a “concerted and successful effort to acquire guns
by various local entities” is an assumption based on the examples mentioned above. The fact that towns
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and wealthy individuals possessed guns during this period does not mean that there was a “concerted
effort” to acquire them. Second, DeVries’ argument about a lack of centralized control is based on the
perceived lack of interest in stockpiling guns in royal armories. DeVries does not demonstrate that any
English king ever attempted to restrict the ownership of guns by towns or individuals. Instead, he
assumes that the possession of guns by towns and individuals at a time when the king supposedly
possessed fewer guns indicates a lack of control. This in turn assumes that the relationship between the
Crown, the nobility, and local authorities was antagonistic.
It is more likely that the Crown benefitted from and encouraged local ownership of ordnance,
just as it benefitted from and encouraged the local ownership of bows and ships. Southampton serves as
an excellent example of how local military organization played an important role in coastal defense.
Moffett writes, “By 1450 there is little doubt that Southampton had fully adopted firearms into their
defensive strategy. Powder, guns, chambers, carts, firearms, and specialists could all be found in the
town and were kept at the ready.”291 Southampton relied on the services of specialists to clean, repair,
and maintain guns; produce and transport gunpowder and stone shot; and craft necessary items like gun
tampons.292 The town was also heavily involved in the production and trade of bows and bowstaves.293
Such diligent military preparation by coastal towns like Southampton is a reflection of the cooperative
relationship between the Crown and local authorities, not a lack of central administration over
ordnance. In fact, Henry VI appointed a chaplain, John Gadstone, to “serve the king in the tower of
Southampton, to celebrate divine service there for the good estate of the king, and to keep the
armouries, artilleries, victuals, machines and other goods in the tower for the munition and defence
thereof, and to control all works to be done therein.”294
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The fact that arms and ammunition already existed throughout the localities meant that there
was a pool for the Crown to draw from. The evidence in the patent rolls shows that the Crown
continued to utilize a system of purveyance and impressment to mobilize ordnance and the manpower
it required. In April 1459, Henry VI commissioned John Judde, master of the king’s ordnance, and several
other men to “purvey bows, arrows and cords for bows and other things necessary to the office of the
artillery and the offices of ‘des bowyers, flecchers and stryngers,’ and carriage therefor, and to arrest
the workmen and labourers necessary herein.”295 At the end of the year, the king officially granted
Judde the “wages of 50£ yearly by the hands of the sheriffs of London from their receipts of the green
wax and the subsidy on strangers dwelling in the city.”296 As tensions grew in 1460, carpenters and other
skilled workers were impressed as needed. In February, William Bungey, John Wheler, and John Smyth
were commissioned to take wheelers, cartwrights, smiths “and other workmen for the working of carts
for the carriage of bombards and cannons to the parts of Wales, and to purvey timber and iron
therefor.”297 The next month, John Judde and several others were commissioned to take wheelers,
cartwrights, “and other carpenters, stonemasons, smiths, plumbers, artificers and workmen for the
works of the king’s ordnance, and bombards, cannons, ‘culvryns,’ ‘serpentyns,’ crossbows, bows,
arrows, ‘saltpetre,’ powder for cannons, lead, iron and all other stuff for the said ordnance, and carriage
therefor and horses called ‘hakeneys.’”298
Evidently, Thomas Vaghan replaced John Judde after the Yorkists captured Henry VI. In August, a
commission addressing Vaghan as “master of the king’s ordnance” instructed him to take workers and
purvey ordnance and carriage, just as the abovementioned commission to Judde.299 Then, in June 1461,
Edward IV granted the office to Philip Herveys, “with fees as in the last year of Edward III and the first of
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Richard II.”300 In the meantime, the new king continued to rely on familiar systems to keep his armies
equipped. In March, the king commissioned William Lee, “joynour,” to “find carriage and labourers
called ‘carters’ with horses and oxen for three cannons or great bumbards which the king has ordered to
be sent for the siege of the castle of Thorpwaterfeld.”301 In June, Nicholas Wydower, bowyer, was
commissioned to “provide bows, wood for bows called ‘bowystafes,’ and other things pertaining to his
mystery for the king’s equipment in bows, and carriage for the same and bowyers and labourers.”302 The
next month, the king tasked Philip Harveys with procuring workers, ordnance, and carriage in the usual
fashion.303 In August, the king commissioned men to procure “cables, cordage and other gear for a ship
called la Grace Dieu at the expense of the king’s kinsman Richard, earl of Warwick.”304
The patent rolls for the period of 1459 to 1461 also demonstrate the existence of a range of
offices related to the production and keeping of military materiel. In December 1459, Henry VI granted
Robert Mykawe “the keeping of the king’s armouries in Pountfret castle, co. York, as Christopher
Armorer alias Robynson had, to hold himself or by deputy, with the usual wages, fees and profits.”305 In
July 1461, Edward IV granted Thomas Gybbys the office of “king’s torchmaker and link armourer.”306 A
separate entry states that Thomas Mountgomery also received “the office called ‘lynge armurer’ within
the Tower of London.”307 The same month, Nicholas Wydnare received the office of “making the king’s
bows within the Tower of London, with wages from the issues of the counties of Surrey and Sussex.”308
This is probably a misspelling of Nicholas Wydower. In December, the king affirmed Wydower in the
“office of making the king’s bows within the Tower of London,” which he had apparently held since
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March 4th.309 Other entries reveal other important offices filled in the summer of 1461. The king
appointed Stephen Clampard the office of “master smith within the Tower of London, receiving fees as
in the times of Edward III and Richard II at the Exchequer, with a mansion, two gardens and a house
called ‘Powederhous’ in the Tower, a mansion on the wharf of the Tower, a parcel of land within the
king’s palace of Westminster and all other things pertaining to the office, and a robe yearly at the great
wardrobe.”310 In August, the king appointed Thomas Sandeland as “king’s cannoneer in North Wales and
the counties of Chester and Flint.”311 Later in the year, the king granted Henry Crane the “office of
making and keeping the king’s arrows within the Tower of London” as a reward “for his good service to
the king and his father.”312
Again, the records show the existence of a robust central administration which did not diminish
in strength or importance during civil war. The Crown continued to effectively mobilize ordnance and
manpower through the use of royal officials and commissioners. The impressment of laborers and
craftsmen was an essential aspect of this process. There are no instances of large-scale defiance to these
demands recorded within the patent rolls, which suggests that the Crown could still expect obedience
from its subjects. Additionally, the records from this period show that numerous individuals were
appointed to a variety of offices related to the production and maintenance of arms and ammunition.
The power of the Crown was still strong.
The mobilization of arms for expeditionary action required even more administrative activity.
Because Edward IV’s preparations in the early 1470s were so extensive, there is considerable
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information about mobilizing men and materiel for foreign service in the patent rolls for that period. An
entry dated December 25, 1472 reads as follows:
Appointment of Roger Kelsale, yeoman of the crown, to take carpenters called ‘whelers’ and
‘cartwrightes’ and other carpenters, stone-cutters, smiths, plumbers, bowmakers, boltmakers
and other workmen for the works of the king’s ordnance and bombards, cannons, ‘colverynes,’
‘fowlers,’ ‘serpentynes’ and other canons and powder, sulphur, saltpetre, stone, iron, lead and
other necessaries for them, crossbows and bolts for them, arrows, ‘bowstaves,’ ‘bowestringes,’
lances, ‘gleyves’ and hammers and other necessaries for the ordnance and carriage for the same
and horses called ‘hakneys’ and ships and other vessels.
The like to the king’s servant Richard Milton, yeoman of the chamber.313
Entries such as this appear frequently throughout this period. Earlier the same month, the king
appointed John Moklowe to the same task but included “langdebeves” in the list of arms to be procured
and instructed Moklowe to procure carriage “by land and water” rather than specifying to take horses
and ships.314 William Moklowe and John Colshyll received similar orders in July 1473 followed by Richard
Copcote and John Scott in December 1474.315
These long entries appear often enough in the patent rolls for royal clerks to develop a formula
when discussing the maintenance and distribution of royal ordnance. The formula begins by explaining
the kinds of craftsmen required, go on to detail the materiel required, and end with instructions to
procure transportation. Furthermore, the formula clarifies that the list is not a limitation on what the
recipient is to take. The entries in the patent rolls always include instructions to take “other workmen,”
“other cannons,” and “other necessaries” in addition to what is specified. In other words, the king cast
his nets widely when mobilizing ordnance companies. The fact that the Crown could rely on its
commissioners to mobilize so much armament, manpower, and transportation is indicative of its
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authority. It is also evidence of the loyalty of the king’s commissioners and local authorities who would
have cooperated with them in these matters.
These orders related to ordnance also highlight the importance of craftsmen and other
specialists. Andy King discusses the importance of such men in his article “Gunners, Aides and Archers:
The Personnel of the English Ordnance Companies in Normandy in the Fifteenth Century.” As the title
suggests, King’s article focuses on those serving in France during the Hundred Years’ War. King explains
that the development of the artillery component of English military organization began quickening with
the establishment of the office of “Master of the King’s Ordnance in Normandy” in 1423.316 He writes
that “the master filled an administrative rather than a technical role and his office, did not, therefore,
call for any gunnery expertise.”317 Using surviving muster records from the 1430s and 1440s, King shines
a light on the composition of English artillery teams. He writes, “…it appears that a core company of
seven ordnance personnel was retained at Rouen, together with an escort of a man-at-arms and twelve
or eighteen archers. The seven specialists consisted of a master forger and his aide, a master carpenter
and his aide, a master mason, a master gunner and a carter.”318 King also provides an excellent
explanation of the roles which each specialist performed. He writes, “Forgers, or smiths, were employed
to maintain and repair the guns. Carpenters were required to construct wooden firing carriages for the
artillery, for guns were usually transported separately, without a carriage, which would be constructed
on site, although these were sometimes assembled from prefabricated parts.”319 Additionally,
carpenters constructed mantlets to protect the gun crew during reloading.320 Because “stone shot
remained the usual form of ammunition” during this period, “masons were required to cut the stone to
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size, a task which obviously required a high degree of precision.”321 Gunners loaded and fired the guns
and carters moved them.322
King concludes that there was a “high turnover rate and a surprising lack of specialization”
within these units.323 He explains that “carpenters, forgers and masons must have been recruited from
among those who already possessed these skills in civilian life, but nevertheless they were often
required to act as jacks-of-all-trades.”324 The need for gunners only existed in a military context,
however. King notes that serving as a gunner did not “offer much in the way of prospects of
enrichment” through plunder and the ransoming of prisoners.325 This fact, in addition to the “dirty and
deafeningly noisy environment,” probably contributed to the high turnover rate.326
Unsurprisingly, the patent rolls demonstrate that the English kings continued to rely on the
same types of specialists well after the end of the Hundred Years’ War. In February 1473 Edward IV
appointed “William Crowe, ‘smyth,’ and John Eton, ‘wheler,’ to take carpenters called ‘whelers’ and
‘cartwrightes’ and other carpenters and workmen for the works of waggons and wheels for the king’s
ordnance and smiths and timber and iron and other necessaries and carriage for the same.”327 The
following entry from the same month demonstrates the point:
Appointment of John Michell, ‘mason,’ to take stone-cutters and other workmen for the works
of stones for cannons for the king’s ordnance, and stones and other necessaries and carriage for
the same.
The like of Walter Ryvers of Wodestok to take artificers called ‘flecchers’ for the works of arrows
for the king’s ordnance, and timber, wax, silk, feathers and other necessaries and carriage for
the same.
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The like of John Smyth, ‘wheler,’ to take carpenters called ‘whelers’ and ‘cartwrightes’ and other
carpenters and workmen for the works of carts and wheels for the king’s ordnance, and timber
and iron and other necessaries and carriage for the same.328
Specialists related to the production of bows and arrows also remained important. Evidently,
Edward IV was very interested in having a large supply of bows and arrows produced in the early 1470s.
In December 1472, he appointed “Thomas a Byrley of Hekelesfeld and William Swyfte of Sheffeld” to
“take smiths and other workmen for the works of the king’s ordnance viz for the making of ‘lez
arowhedes’ within the county of York and ‘arowhedes’ and iron and other necessaries and carriage for
the same by land and water.”329 In February 1473, Thomas Blanchard was tasked with “taking”
“workmen called ‘bowyers’ and ‘flecchers’ and other workmen for the works of the king’s ordnance and
arrows, ‘bowestringes,’ ‘langedebeves,’ lances, ‘gleyves,’ hammers and other necessaries.”330 The
following month, three different men were appointed to “take sheaves of arrows, arrowheads, timber,
feathers, silk, wax and other necessaries for the king’s arrows within the Tower of London or for the
present army and carriage for the same and ‘flecchers’ and other labourers and workmen.”331 In
February 1474, the king granted Thomas Marsburgh “the office of surveyor of the king’s bowmakers
within the Tower of London, the office of keeper of the king’s bows within the Tower and the office of
keeping, making, and providing the king’s bows in the said Tower and the town of Calais, the land of
Ireland and elsewhere and cords for them.”332 According to the grant, Thomas had been active in this
office since August 1473.333 In May 1474, Edward IV sent commissions to men throughout England “to
make payments of prest money to fletchers for the manufacture of ‘shefe arrowes,’ workmen for the
manufacture of bows and ‘bowestaves,’ smiths for the manufacture of arrowheads and workmen called
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‘strengers’ for the manufacture of strings for bows.”334 The commission explicitly states that the king
“caused proclamations to be made by the sheriffs... for the manufacture of the same with all speed for
the ordnance of the army going with him to France for the recovery of that realm and his right there.”335
Similar commissions were sent out again in December for the same reason.336
The king wanted a lot more than just cannons, bows, and arrows. In the months leading up to
the invasion of France in 1475, more detailed entries start to appear in the patent rolls. In February, the
king commissioned James Hyet to “take 80 diggers or workmen called ‘myners’” for the expedition to
France.337 The following month, the king issued a very detailed commission to William Rosse, which
reads as follows:
Commission to William Rosse, esquire, to take carpenters called ‘whelers’ and ‘cartwrightes’ and
other carpenters, joiners, stonecutters, smiths, plumbers, ‘shippewrights,’ ‘coupers,’ ‘sawyers,’
‘flecchers,’ ‘chariotmen,’ ‘horsharneys makers’ and other workmen within the realm of England
and the town and marches of Calais and elsewhere under the king’s obedience for the works of
the king’s ordnance, and bombards, cannons, culverins, ‘fowelers,’ ‘serpentynes,’ and other
cannon, powder, sulphur, saltpetre, stone, iron, lead and other necessaries, crossbows and bolts
for them, bows, arrows, ‘arrowtymbre,’ ‘bowestaves,’ ‘bowestrynges,’ ‘billes,’ ‘axes,’
‘langedebefes,’ lances, ‘gleyves,’ hammers, armaments of war, oaks, elms, ashes, beeches,
alder, birch, holm and other timber, ‘tanned leder’ and ‘calveskynnes’ and other necessaries for
the ordnance, and all ships and vessels of 16 tons and over and masters and mariners for
them.338
Also in March, Thomas Asshe and Nicholas Longe were commissioned to “take workmen called
‘brygandynemakers’ and all stuffs necessary for making ‘brygandynes.’”339 The king’s saddler, John
Jakes, received a commission to “take saddles, ‘traisis,’ hide and other necessaries for the office of
saddler for the king’s voyage to France.”340 Thomas Brewer, “bogemaker,” was commissioned to ”take
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hides and other necessaries for making leather bags, ‘berehides’ and ‘clothsackes,’ and workmen for the
same.”341 In May, the king appointed Thomas Thomson, “aresmaker,” to “take workmen called ‘tapestre
wevers’ for the king’s works of cloth called ‘tapettis’ to be made for horses called ‘somerhors’ and
‘chariott hors.’”342
All of this evidence demonstrates the range of expertise which the Crown commanded during
this period. When it came to military matters, the king had the authority to impress specialists and
general laborers for service overseas. More specifically, the king could delegate such authority to named
individuals and expect that those individuals would wield that authority in the Crown’s best interest. The
Crown could even compel localities to produce large numbers of bows and arrows. An overseas
expedition could never materialize if the king could not command the obedience of the men he
empowered or the men being impressed. The fact that such expeditions were organized successfully is
testament to the enduring power of the English Crown, the loyalty of its agents, and the obedience of its
subjects.
Provisions
A large army required large quantities of provisions. Without a centralized administration
capable of mobilizing food, drink, and transportation, keeping an expeditionary army together would
have been a difficult task. The information contained within the patent rolls demonstrates that the
Crown presided over a robust administration capable of victualling its expeditionary armies. The success
of a large-scale mobilization of food and drink, like the one required for Edward IV’s invasion of France
in 1475, depended on the Crown’s ability to project its authority through royal agents.
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The records related to the expedition of 1475 are particularly informative about how the Crown
provided for its forces. Because food is perishable, victuals were prepared in May and June, just before
the invading army departed. On May 8, the king appointed Stephen Frynde to “take wheat, beeves,
muttons, sea-fish and fresh-water fish and all victuals for the king’s army soon to be sent to France.”343
The same month, Edmund Countes and William Felsted were appointed to “take wheat, malt, beeves,
muttons, pigs, sea-fish and fresh-water fish and all necessaries for the king’s army... and carriage for the
same.”344 Other entries concerning victuals follow the same formula with only slight variations. On May
14, Robert Chattok and Robert Talbott were appointed to “take wheat, wine, ale, beeves, muttons, seafish and fresh-water fish and other victuals for the king’s army... and carriage for the same.”345 On June
1, Robert Waryngton was appointed to “take wheat, flour, beeves, muttons, sea fish and fresh-water
fish and all other victuals for the king’s army... and carriage for the same.”346 On June 14, John Lynford
was ordered to “take beeves, muttons, sea fish and fresh-water fish and other victuals for the army...
and carriage for the same.”347 Days later, Thomas Desford was ordered to “take wheat, wine, beeves,
muttons, fish etc” and Druett Gosselyn was appointed to “take wheat, oats, beeves, muttons, sea fish
and fresh-water fish etc.”348 As late as July 1, George Grenefeld was appointed to “take wheat, beeves,
muttons, sea fish and fresh-water fish and other victuals for the king’s army... and carriage for the
same.”349
As these records demonstrate, the Crown called on a number of men to mobilize provisions for
the army. If there were any instances in which local authorities refused to cooperate with the Crown in
these matters, they do not appear in the records. Given the Crown’s usual diligence about recording the
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consequences of disobedience, it is reasonable to assume that a refusal to provide provisions for the
army would have warranted an entry in the patent rolls. The fact that no such entry appears suggests
that the king’s commissioners faced minimal resistance from the localities.
Some entries provide more information about what sort of “carriage” was required for so many
provisions. On May 11, Robert Michelson was commissioned to “take ships and vessels for the carriage
of 4,000 quarters of wheat for the victualling of the king’s army to be sent to France... and masters and
mariners for them and carriage by land if necessary.”350 On May 24, John Cauthorn was similarly
commissioned to “take ships and vessels in the ports of Boston and Grymmesby and elsewhere if
necessary for the carriage of 2,000 quarters of wheat flour for the victualling of the king’s army... and
masters and mariners for them and carriage by land if necessary.”351 These commissions refer only to
the specified quantities of wheat and make no mention of all of the meat, fish, ale, and other provisions
mentioned in other orders. Whether all of the above-mentioned victuals were procured from within the
British Isles is unclear from the records. It is possible that some were acquired on the continent and did
not require transportation across the channel. In any case, a number of the ships which sailed across the
channel with Edward IV’s army were filled with wheat and other victuals.
Again, the king’s power to command his subjects and mobilize their resources is apparent. To
provide enough victuals for a large overseas expedition, the king needed to be able to delegate the
authority to purvey and seize what the army required. Royal agents, acting on the king’s authority,
needed to be able to compel obedience from the subjects who were expected to provide services,
victuals, or transportation. Furthermore, diverting large quantities of wheat and other foodstuffs to the
use of the army must have had an impact on the civilian population of England. The fact that the army
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was mobilized and victualled despite the strain it must have placed upon the domestic food supply is
indicative of the Crown’s ability to project its authority.
Domestic conflict did not require the same degree of logistical planning as overseas service, but
provisions still warranted royal administration. As Henry VI mobilized naval forces against the earl of
Warwick in March 1460, he commissioned Robert Sende and Henry Bisshop to “purvey wheat, meal,
oxen, sheep, and other flesh and fish, and ale, beer and all other victuals for the money of Henry, duke
of Exeter, to victual the ships.”352 Henry VI’s commission to Simon Hammes to arrest masters and
mariners for Exeter’s fleet included similar instructions to purvey victuals for la Marie.353 In March 1461,
Edward IV commissioned Robert Elmham and several others to “buy and provide wheat, rye, barley,
beans, peas, and other kinds of grain for the king’s store.”354 Around the same time, he appointed
William Rippley and William Harpcote to “provide victuals and habiliments of war and carriage for the
same for the king’s use in marching against the rebels.”355 In May, several men were appointed to
“provide wheat, malt, oxen, muttons, fish, salt, and other things for the victualling of the king’s ships,
and carriage for the same.”356 John Stokes, John Aldey, Henry Auger, and Thomas Meliour each received
vague commissions to “provide all kinds of victuals for an expedition by sea against the king’s
enemies.”357 In August, John Otter and several others were ordered to “provide wheat, beans, peas, fish,
wine, ale and other victuals” for la Grace Dieu in addition to ordnance and workers.358
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V. CONCLUSION
As the evidence from the patent rolls suggests, English military organization during this period
depended on a functional relationship between the Crown and its subjects. Expeditionary forces relied
on the Crown’s ability to provide funding, transportation, victuals, ordnance, and specialists.
Mobilization for coastal defense and other domestic service was based on the Crown’s authority to raise
local forces via commissions of array. The maintenance and administration of garrisons required royal
officers and constant funding. Whenever possible, the Crown funded military forces by granting access
to local sources of revenue which he had the authority to manipulate. In short, the Crown commanded
the manpower and resources which made English military forces function.
The Crown was never weak and the nobility never rallied against it. If Henry VI was indeed a
flawed king, as many suggest, the nobility had a vested interest in propping him up to maintain the
Crown’s prestige. The coercive authority of the Crown is what made military action legitimate and
possible. This is why the period of civil war from 1459 until Edward IV’s ascension to the throne in 1461
played out as a war over custody of Henry VI. He represented the Crown, the source of legitimate
military authority. The Yorkists could not legitimately fight against the king, but they could “rescue” him
from the influence of the Lancastrians. With Henry VI in their custody, the Yorkists were able to wield his
military authority for a while. In the king’s name, they mobilized men and resources against the
Lancastrians. They could not dispose of Henry VI until the Crown was placed on the head of Edward IV.
From that point on, Edward IV could and did wield royal authority openly as reigning king. People chose
sides, but everyone claimed to act on behalf of who they believed to be the true king of England.
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